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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
Nos. 71- 1017

AND

Circul ated:~-

.6--7

;:2.--

STATIXirculated:

71- 1026

Mike Gravel, United States
Senator,
v.
71-1017
On Writs of Certiorari to
United States.
the United States Court
of
Appeals for the First
United States, Petitioner,
Circuit.
71- 1026
v.
Mike Gravel, United States
Senator.
[June -, 1972]
MR. J uSTICE WHI'l'E delivered the opinion of the
Court.
These cases arise out of the investigation by a federal
grand jury into possible criminal conduct with respect
to the release and publication of a classified Defense
Department study entitled "History of the United States
Decision-Making Process on Viet Nam Policy." This
document, popularly known as the "Pentagon Papers,"
bore a Defense security classification of Top SecretSensitive. The crimes being investigated included the
retent.ion of J)Ublic property or records with intent to
convert (18 U. S. C. § 641) the gathering and transmitting of national defense information ( 18 U. S. C.
§ 793), the concealment or removal of public records
or documents (18 U. S. C. § 2071), and conspiracy to
commit such offenses and to defraud the United States
(18 U. S. C. § 371).
Among the witnesses subpoenaed wore Leonard S.
Rodberg, an assistant to Senator Mike Gravel of Alaska
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and a resident fellow at the Institute of Policy Studies,
and Howard Webber, Director of M. I. T. Press. Senator Gravel, as intervenor/ filed motions to quash the
subpoenas and to require the Government to specify
the particular questions to be addressed to Rodberg. ~
He asserted that naming these \vitnesses to appear and
testify would violate his privilege under the Speech or
Debate Clause of the United States Constitution, Art. I,
§ 6, Cl. 1.
It appeared that on the night of June 29, 1971, Senator Gravel , as Chairman of the Subcommittee on Buildings and Grounds of the Senate Public Works Committee, convened a meeting of the Subcommittee and there
read extensively from a copy of the Pentagon Papers.
The District Court prrmitted Senator Gr:wd to intcrn'ne in
the procrcding on Dr. Rodberg's motion to qunsh the subpoena
ordering his appcnrnnre before the grand jury and accepted motions
from Gran'! to qunsh the snbpo<'na and to specify the cx:1et nature
of tlic questions to be asked Rodbrrg. The Go,-ernment contested
Grn\'C'l':,; ~ tanding to appeal thr trial court's di~position of these
motions on thr ground that , had thr subpoena been direct ed to the
Senator, he could not haYe appcalrd from :1 drni:tl of a motion to
qunsh without fir;-:t rrfu,;ing to romp!~· with the subpoenn and bring
held in contrmp1. United States v. Ryan, 402 U. S. 530 (1971);
f'obbledick v. United States, 309 U. S. 32~ (1940). The Court of
Apprnls, United States v. Doe, 45.5 F. 2d 758, 756-757 (CAl 1972),
held thn t bern use 1hr subporm wn~ dircrtrd to third parties, who
could not br rountrd on to risk contempt to protect intcn·cnor's
rights, Crawl might be "powerbs to a\·rrt the mischief of the
ordrr" if not prrmitted to appml, citing Perlman v. United States,
247 U. S. 7, 18 (1918). The United States doc~ not here ch:111rngc
the propriety of thr :tppenl.
2
Dr. Rodberg, who filed his own motion to quash the ~uhpocna
directed hi~ appmrnnrc and tcstimon~·, apprnrrd ns amicus curiae
both in the Court of Appeab :md thi~ Comt. Tcrlmirnlly, Rodbcrg
stntrs, he is a Jlnrty to 71-102fl , in ~ofa r as the Go\'C'l'nmcnt nppcals
from the protertiYc order entered by the District Court. Uowc,·cr,
since Gravel inter,·cncd, Roclbcrg docs not press the point. Brief
of Leonard 8. Rodbcrg ns Amicus Curiae 2, n. 2.
1
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He then placed the entire 47 volumes of the study in
the public record. Rodberg had been added to the
Senator's staff earlier in the day a.nd assisted Gravel
in preparing for and conducting the hearing.'l Some
weeks later there ''"ere press reports that Gravel had
arranged for the papers to be published by Beacon
Press ·• and that members of Gravel's staff had talked
with Webber as editor of M. I. T. Press."
The District Court overruled the motions to quash
and to specify questions but entered an order proscribing certain categories of questions. United Slates v.
Doe, 332 F. Supp. 930 (Mass. 1971). The Government's contention that for purposes of applying the
Speech or Debate Clause the courts were free to inquire
into the regularity of the subcommittee meeting was
rej ected. 6 Because the clause protected all legislative
rirt Court found " thnt , 'ns per~onnl ns~i~tnnt to mO\·nnt
Rodb c r~ ns~i~ted in preparin~ for di~rlo~ nre nne! snbsrqucntl:; di~rlo~i11g 1o monmt's rollrng:nrs and ron~t it ut rnts, nt a
hrn ring of tho Srnatr Subrommittrr on Publir Buildings nnd Grounds,
the rontents of thr ~o- rnllrd " Prntng:on Pnprrs," whirh wf' rr rriticnl
of thr F.xf'rnt in•\ conduct in thr field of forrign rrb tions.'" United
States \" . Doe, :132 F . Supp. 9:30. 9:12 C:\'Tn~s. 1971).
1
Braron Prrss is n diYi~ion of thr Unit.Hinn UniYer~nlist Assoc intion, whirh apprnrcd llf'rr ns amicuB ruriae in ~ npport of thr position
t11ken b~· Scnntor Grnnl.
~ Gr:wd so allr~c·d in his mot ion to intcn·rnc in tho Webbrr
mattrr and to qua~h th r ~ ubporna ordrring: " 'rhbrr to nppe11r nnd
irstify. App. 15-lR.
0
Thr Go\·rrnnwnt maintninrcl thnt Congrrs,; dor~ not rnjoy unlimitrd ]10\rrr to ronduct bu~inr~s nnd thnt judicial revi rw ha;;; oftrn
b rcn rwrri:;ccl to c·urb extra-lrgi~lntive incur~ion ~ by legi~la1i\"C' committcrs, citing TV atkins v. United States, 35-+ U. S. 178 (1957) ;
llfrGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. K 135 (1927) ; Ilentoff v. ! chord,
318 F. Supp. 1175 tCADC 1970), at least whrrr ~ urh inrur~ion s am
unrcbtecl to a lrgit imatc lcgi ~ lat i\·r purpo~c. It was allrgrd that
Gravel had "rom ·rnrd a sprrial, unauthorizrcl nnd untimrly m eetingof the Senate Subrommittrc on Public Works (at midnight on
Juno 29, 1971), for th e purpose of reading the dorumrnts and there3
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acts, it was held to shield from inquiry anything the
Senator did at the subcommittee meeting and "certain
acts done in preparation therefor." /d .. at 935. The
Senator's privilege also prohibited "inquiry into things
done by Rodberg as the Senator's aide or assistant which
would have been legislative acts, and therefore privilt>ged, if performed by the Senator personally." /d.,
at 937-938. 7 The trial court, however, held the private
republication of the documents was not privileged by
the Speech or Debate Clause. 8
nftrr placed all unrrad portions in the subcommittee rrrord, with
Dr. Rodberg soliciting publication aftrr thr meeting." App. 9. The
Dist rirt Court rrjrctrd the contrntion: "Srna tor Grn vrl has sugp;rstrd that the availability of funds for thr construction and improvrment of publir buildings and grounds has been affertrd by the
nerrssary costs of the war in Virtnam and that therrfore the development and conduct of the war is properly within the concrrn
of the subcommittre. Thr court rrjrrts the Governmrnt's argument. without detnilrd considrration of the merits of the Senator's
position, on the bnsis of thr general rule restricting inquiry into
matters of legis !at i1·r purpo,;e and operations." United States v.
Doe, 332 F. Supp. 980. 985 (Mnss. 1971). Cases such as Watkins,
supra, were distinguished on the ground that they concrrned the
power of Congress undrr the Constitution: "It has not been suggrsted by the govrrnment that the subcommittee itself is unauthorized, nor that thr wnr in Vietnam is an issue beyond the purview of
congressional debate and :tction. Also, the individual rights at
stake in these proceedings arc not those of a witness before a congrrssional committee or of a subject of a committee's investigation,
but only those of a congressman and member of his personal staff
who claim 'intimidation by the exrcutivc.'" !d., at 736.
7
The District Court thought that Rodbcrg could be qucstionrd
concerning his own conduct prior to joining the Senator's staff and
comPrning the acti1·itie~ of third parties with whom Rodbcrg and
Gravel dealt. United Statrs v. Dol', 332 F. Supp. 930, 934 (:i\fass.
1971).
8 The protective order entered by the Di trict Court pro1·ided as
follows:
"(1) No witness before the gr:tncl jury cnrr<:'ntly im·estigating therelease of the Pentagon Papers mny be questioned about Senator
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The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the motions to quash but modified the protective order to.
reflect its own views of the scope of the congressional
privilege. United States v. Doe, 455 F. 2d 753 (CAl
1972). Agreeing that Senator and aide were one for
the purposes of the Speech or Debate Clause and that
the clause foreclosed inquiry of both Senator and aide
with respect to legislative acts, the Court of Appeals
also viewed the privilege as barring direct inquiry of
the Senator or his aide, but not of third parties, as to·
the sources of the Senator's information used in performing legislative duties.n Although it did not consider private republication by the Senator or Beacon
Press to be protected by the Constitution, the Court
of Appeals apparently held that neither Senator nor aide
could be questioned about it because of a common law
privilege akin to the judicially created immunity of executive officers from liability for libel contained in a
news release issued in the course of their normal duties.
See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 564 ( 1959). This privilege, fashioned by the Court of Appeals, would not
Mike Gravel's conduct at a meeting of the Subcommittee on Public
Buildings and Grounds on June 29, 1971, nor about things done by
the Senator in preparation for and intimately related to said meeting.
"(2) Dr. Leonard S. Rodberg may not be questioned about his own
actions on June 29, 1971, after having been engaged as a member·
of Senator Gravel's personal staff to the extent that they were done
at the Senator's direction either at a meeting of the Subcommittee
on Public Buildings and Grounds or in preparation for nnd intimately related to snid meeting."
9 The Court of Appeal~ thought third parties could be questioned
as to their own conduct regarding the Pentagon Papers, "including their dealings with intervenors or hi,; aides." United States v.
Roe, 455 F. 2d 753, 761 (CAl 1972). The court found no merit
in the claim that such parties should be shielded from questioning
under the Speech or Debate Clause concerning their own wrongful
act~, even if ~uch que~:>tioJJing may bring the Senator's conduct into.
que:;tion. !d., at 758, n. 2.
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protect third parties from similar inquiries before the
grand jury. As modified by the Court of Appeals, the
protective order to be observed by prosecution and gra.nd
JUry \Yas:
" ( 1) K o witness before the gra11d jury currcn tly
investigating the release of the Pentagon Papers
may be questioned about Senator Mike Gravel's
conduct at a meeting of the Subcommittee on Public Buildings and Grounds on June 29, 1971, nor,
if the questions arc directed to the motives or purposes behind the Senator's conduct a.t that meeting, about any communications with him or with
his aides regarding the activities of the Senator
or his aides during the period of their employment,
in preparation for and related to said meeting.
"(2) Dr. Leona.rd S. Rodberg may not be questioned about his mrn actions in the broadest sense,
including observat-ions and communications, oral or
written , by or to him, or coming to his attention
while being interviewed for, or after having been
engaged as a member of Senator Gravel's personal
staff to the extent that they were in the course
of his employment."
The United States petitioned for certiorari challenging the ruling that aides and other persons may not
be questioned with respect to legislative acts and that
an aide to a Member of Congress has a common-law
privilege not to testify before a grand jury with respect
to private republication of materials introduced into
a subcommittee record. Senator Gravel also petitioned
for certiorari seeking reversal of the Court of Appeals
insofar as it held private republication Ullprotectecl by
the Speech or Debate Clause and asserting tha.t the protective ordN of the Court of Appeals too narrowly
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protected against inquiries that a grand jury could direct
to third parties. We gran ted both petitions. 405 U. S.
916 (1972).
I
Because the claim is that a Member's aide shares
the Member's constitutional privilege, we consider first
whether and to what extent Senator Gravel himself is
exempt from process or inquiry by a grand jury investigating the commission of a crime. Our frame of referC'IlCe is Art. I, ~ 6, cl. 1, of the Constitution:
"The Senators and Representatives shall receive
a Compensation for their Services, to be ascertained
by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United
States. They shall in all Cases, except Treason,
Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from
Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of
their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from tho same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned
in a11y other Place."
The last sentence of the clause provides Members of
Congress with two distinct privileges. Except in cases
of "Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace," the clause
shiclds Members from arrest "·hile attending or traveling
to and from a session of their House. History reveals.
and prior cases so hold. that this part of the clause
exempts Members from arrest in civil cases only.
"When the Constitution was adopted, arrests in civil
suits 'vere common in America. It is only to such arrests that the provision applies." Long v. Ansell, 293
U. S. 76, 83 (1034) (footnote omitted). "Since . . .
the terms treason, felony and breach of the peace. as
used in the constitutional provision relied upon, excepts from the operation of privilege all criminal offenses,
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the conclusion results that the claim of privilege of
exemption from arrest and sentence was without
merit . . . . " Williamson v. United Sta.tes, 207 U. S.
425, 446 (1908). 1 0 Nor does freedom from arrest confer immunity on a Member from service of process as
a defendant in civil matters, Long v. Ansell, supra, at
82-83, or as a witness in a criminal case. "The Constitution gives to every man, charged with an offense,
the benefit of compulsory process, to secure the attendance of his witnesses. I do not know of any privilege
to exempt members of Congress from the service, or
the obligations, of a. subpoena, in such cases." United
States v. Cooper, 4 Dall. 340, 341 (1800) (per Chase, J.,
sitting on Circuit). It is, therefore, sufficiently plain
that the constitutional freedom from arrest does not exempt Members of Congress from the operation of the
ordinary criminal laws, even though imprisonment may
prevent or interfere with the performance of their duties
as Members. Williamson v. United States, supra; cf.
Burton v. United States, 202 U. S. 344 (1906). Indeed, implicit in the narrow scope of the privilege of
freedom from arrest is. as Jefferson noted, the judgment
that legislators ought not to stand above the law they
create but ought generally to be bound by it as are
ordinary persons. Jefferson, Manual of Parliamenta.ry
Practice, S. Doc. No. 91- 2437 (1971).
In recognition, no doubt, of the force of this part of
Clause 6, Senator Gravel disavo·ws any assertion of genWilliamson, United States CongrrR~man, had bem found guilty
of conspiring to commit suborni\tion of prrjnry in connection with
proceedings for the purchaRe of public land. He objected to the
court. passing sentence upon him and particularly protested that any
imprisonment would depri,·c him of his conRtitutional right to "go
to, attend at and return from the cn~uing session of Congress."
Williamson v. United States, 207 U. S. 425, 432-433 (1908). The
Court rejected the contention that the Speech or Debate Clause freed
legislators from arcountability for criminal conduct.
10
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eral immunity fron1 the criminal law. But he points
out that the last portion of Clause 6 affords Members
of Congress another vital privilege-they may not be
questioned in any other place for any speech or debate
in either House. The claim is not that while one part
of Clause 6 generally permits prosecutions for treason,
felony and breach of the peace, another part nevertheless broadly forbids them. Rather, his insistence is
that the Speech or Debate Clause at the very least protects him from criminal or civil liability and from questioning elsewhere than in the Senate, with respect to
the events occurring at the subcommittee hearing at
which the Pentagon Papers were introduced into the
public record. To us this claim is incontrovertible.
The Speech or Debate Clause was designed to assure a
coequal branch of the government wide freedom of
speech, debate and deliberation without intimidation or
threats from the Executive Branch It thus protects
Members against prosecutions that directly impinge
upon or threaten the legislative process. We have no
doubt that Senator Gravel may not be made to answer-either in terms of questions or in terms of defending himself from prosecution-for the events that
occurred at the subcommittee meeting. Our decision
is made easier by the fact that the United States appears to have abandoned whatever position it took to
the contrary in the lower courts.
Even so, the United States strongly urges that because the Speech or Debate Clause confers a privilege
only upon "Senators and Representatives," Rodberg
himself has no valid claim to constitutional immunity
from grand jury inquiry. In our view, both courts
below correctly rejected this position. We agree with
the Court of Appeals that for the purpose of construing
the privilege a Member and his aide are to be "treated
as one," United States v. Doe, 455 F. 2d 753, 761 (CAl
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1972); or, as the District Court 1mt it: The "Speech or
Debate Clause prohibits inquiry into things done by
Dr. Rodberg as the Senator's agent or assistant which
"·ould have been legislative acts, and therefore privileged, if performed by the Senator personally." Un·ited
States Y. Doe, 332 F. Supp. 930, 937-938 (Mass. 1971).
Both courts recognized what the Senate of the United
States urgently presses here: that it is literally impossible, in view of the complexities of the modern legislative process, with Congress almost constantly in session and matters of legislative concern constantly proliferating. for Members of Congress to perform their
legislative tasks without the help of aides and assistants;
that the day-to-day work of such aides is so critical to
the Members' performance that they must be treated
as the latters' alter ego; and that if they are not so
recognized, the central role of the Speech or Debate
Clause-to prevent intimidation of legislators by the
executive and accountability before a possibly hostile
judiciary, United States Y. Johnson, 383 U. S. 160, 181will inevitably be diminished and frustrated. The Court
has already embraced similar vie\YS in Barr Y. llfalleo,
360 U. S. 564 (1959), ''"here in immunizing the Acting
Director of the Office of Rent Stabilization from liability for an alleged libel contained in a press release, the
Court held that the executive privilege recognized in
prior cases roulcl not be restricted to those of cabinet
rank. As stated by Mr. Justice Harlan, "the privilege'
is not a badge or emolument of exalted office. but an
expression of a policy designee! to aid in the effccti ve
functioning of Government. The complexities and magnitude of governmental activity have become so great
that there must be a delegation and redelcgation. and
"·e cannot say that these functions become less important simply because they are exercised by officers of
lo\\·er rank in the executive hierarchy." !d., at 572- 573.
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H is true that the clause itself mentions only "Senators and Representatives," but prior cases have plainly
not taken a literalistic approach in applying the privilege. The clause a.lso speaks only of "Speech or Debate," Lut the Court's consistent approach has been that
to confine the protection of the Speech or Debate Clause
to words spoken in debate \vould be an unacceptably
narrow view. Committee reports, resolutions. and the
act, of voting arc equally covered; "riln short, . . .
things generally done in a session of the House by one
of its members in relation to tho business before it."
Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168. 204 (1800), quoted
with approval in United States v. Johnson, 383 U. S.
169,179 (1966). Ratherthangivingtheclauseacramped
construction, the Court has sought to implement its
fundamental purpose of freeing the legislator from executive and judicial oversight that realistically threaten
to control his conduct as a legislator. \Ve have littledoubt that we arc neither exceeding our judicial powers
nor mistakenly construing the Constitution by holding
that tho Speech or Debate Clause applies not only to a
Member but also to his aides insofar as the conduct of
the latter would be a protected legislative act if performed by the Member himself.
Nor can \VO agree \\"ith the United States that our
conclusion is foreclosed by Knbourn v. 'Thompson, supra,
Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U. S. 82 (1967), and Pow-·
ell Y. J1fcCormack, 395 U. S. 486 (10G9), where tho·
speech or debate privilege was hold una vailablo to certain House and committee employees. Those cases do
not hold that persons other than Members of Congress
are beyond tho protection of the clause when they perform or aiel in the performance of legislative acts. In
](. ilbourn, the Speech or Debate Clause protected House
Members who had adopted a resolution authorizing
Kilbourn's arrest; that act \Vas clearly legislative in na-
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ture. But tho resolution was subject to judicial review
insofar as its execution impinged on a citizen's rights as
it did there. That the House could with in1punity order
an unconstitutional arrest afforded no protection for
those who made the arrest. The Court quoted ;vith approval from Stockdale v. Hansard, 9 Ad. & E. 1. 112 K. B.
1112 (1839): "So if the Speaker by authority of tho
House order an illegal act, though that authority shall
exempt him from question, his order shall no more
justify the person who executed it than King Charles'
warrant for levying ship-money could justify his revenue officer." 103 U. S., at 102. 1 ' The Speech or Debate
Clause could not be construed to immunize an illegal
arrest even though directed by an immune legislative
act. The Court was careful to point out that tho
Members themselves were not implicated in the actual
arrest, id., at 200, and, significantly enough, reserved tho
question whether there might be circwnstances in which
"there may . . . be things done, in the one House or
the other, of an extraordinary character, for which the
members who take part in the act may be held legally
responsible." 103 U. S., at 204 (emphasis added).
Dombrowski v. Eastland, supra, is little different in
principle. The Speech or Debate Clause there protected
In Kilbou7'n, 103 U. S., at 198, the Court noted a second example, used by Mr. Justice Coleridge in Stockdale, 9 Ad. & E., at
225-226, 112 K. B., at 1196-1197: "'LE't me suppose, b~· way of
illustration, an extreme case; the House of Commons resolYes that
any one wearing a dress of a particular manufacture is guilty of a
brl?ach of privilege, and ordrr::; the arrest of such persons by the
constable of the parish. An arrr~t is made and action brought, to
which the order of the HousE' iR plPnded as a justification. . . . In
such a case as the one supposed, the Jllnintiff's counsel would insist
on the distinction brtween power and privilege; and no lawyer can
seriou ·ly doubt that it exists: but the argument confounds them, and
forbids u~ to enquire, in any particular case, whether it ranges
under the one or the other. I can find no principle which sanctions this.' "
11
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a Senator, who was also a subcommittee chairman , but
not the subcommittee counsel. The record contained no
evidence of the Senator's involvement in any activity that
could result in liability, 387 U. S., at 84, "·hereas the
committee counsel was charged with conspiring with
state officials to carry out an illegal seizure of records
'vhich the committee sought for its own proceedings.
Ibid. The committee counsel was deemed protected to
some extent by legislative privilege, but it did not shield
him from answering as yet unproved charges of conspiring to violate the constitutional rights of private parties.
Unlawful conduct of this kind the Speech or Debate
Clause simply did not immunize.
Powell v. McCormick reasserted judicial power to determine the validity of legislative actions impinging on
individual rights-there the illegal exclusion of a representative-elect-and to afford relief against House aides
seeking to implement the invalid resolutions. The Members themselves were dismissed from the case because
shielded by the Speech or Debate Clause both from liability for their illegal legislative act and from having to·
defend themselves with respect to it. As in Kilbourn,
the Court did not reach the question "whether under the
Speech or Debate Clause petitioners would be entitled to
maintain this action solely against the members of Congress where no agent participated in the challenged action
and no other remedy was available." 395 U. S., at 506·
n. 26.
None of these three cases adopted the simple proposition that immunity was unavailable to House or committee employees because they were not Representatives
or Senators; rather, immunity was unavailable because
they engaged in illegal conduct which was not entitled to
Speech or Debate Clause protection. The three cases reflect a decidedly jaundiced view towards extending the
clause so as to privilege illegal or unconstitutional con-
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duct beyond that essential to foreclose executive control
of legislative speech or debate and associated matters such
as voting and committee reports and proceedings. In
Kilbourn, the Sergeant-at-Arms was executing a legislative order, the issuance of which fell within the Speech or
Debate Clause; in Eastland, the committee counsel was
gathering information for a hearing; and in Powell, the
Clerk and Doorkeeper '"ere merely carrying out directions
that were protected by the Speech or Debate Clause. In
each case, protecting the rights of others may have to
some extent frustrated a planned or com.pletecl legislative·
act; but relief could be afforded without proof of a legislative act or the motives or purposes underlying such an
act. No threat to legislative independence was posedr
and Speech or Debate Clause protection did not attach.
None of this, as we see it, involves distinguishing bet,Yeen a Senator and his personal aides with respect to·
legislative im.munity. In Kilbourn-type situations, both
aide and Member should be immune with respect to committee and House action leading to the illegal resolution ..
So too in Eastland, as in this case, senatorial aides should
enjoy immunity for helping a Member conduct committee
hearings. On the other hand, no prior case has held
that Members of Congress \Yould be immune if they
execute an invalid resolution by themselves carrying out
an illegal arrest, or if, in order to secure information for
a hearing, themselves seize the property or invade the·
privacy of a citizen. Neither they nor their aides should
be immune from liability or questioning in such circumstances. Such acts are no more essential to legislating
than the conduct held unprotected in United States v.
Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966).'~
Senator Gran·l is willin~ to n~~nme th:1t if hr prr~onnlly had
the Prntngon Pnprr~, and thnt art \Yrrr n rrime, he could
be pro~ecutecl , :1s could nides or other as.-;i R tnnt~ who J)fll'tirip:1tecl
in the theft. Consolidated Brief of Senator GraYrl 9:1.
12

"~tolen"
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The United States fears the abuses that history reveals have occurred when legislators are invested with
the power to relieve others from the operation of otherwise valid civil and criminal laws. But these abuses, it
seems to us. are for the most part obviated if the privilege
applicable to the aid is viewed, as it must be, as the
privilege of the Senator, and invocable only by the Senator or by the aide on the Senator's behal£, 1 " and if in all
events the privilege available to the aide is confined to
those services that "·ould be immune legislative conduct
if performed by the Senator himself. This view places
beyond the Speech or Debate Clause a variety of services
characteristically 11erformecl by aides for Members of
Congress, even though within the scope of their employmont. It like\\"ise provides no protection for criminal
conduct threatening the security of tho person or property
of others. \\"hether performed at the direction of the
Senator in preparation for or in execution of a legislative
act or done \\"ithout his knowledge or direction. Neither
docs it immunize Senator or aide from testifying at trials
or grand jury proceedings involving third-party crimes
\\"here the questions do not require testimony about or
impugn a legislative act. Thus our refusal to distinguish
bct\\"een Senator and aide in applying the Speech or Debate Clause does not mean that Rodborg is for all purpose exempt from grand jury questioning.
II
\Ye are convinced also that the Court of Appeals correctly determined that Senator Gravel's alleged arrangement with Beacon Press to publish the Pentagon Papers
was not protected speech or debate within the meaning
of Art. I, § 6, cl. 1, of the Constitution.
13 It folloii"H that nn nidC''s claim of pri\·iiPgC' rnn be repuclintC'd and
thus waived b~· tllC' Senator.
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Historically the English legislative privilege was not
viewed as protecting republication of an otherwise immune libel on the floor of the House. Stockdale v. Hansard, 9 Ad. & E. 1, 114, 112 K. B. 1112, 1156 (1839),
recognized that "for speeches made in Parliament by a
member to the prejudice of any other person, or hazardous
to public peace, that member enjoys complete impunity."
But it was clearly stated that "if the calumnious or
infiamatory speeches should be reported and published,
the law will attach responsibility on the publisher." 14
This was accepted in Kilbourn v. Thompson as a "sound
statement of the legal effect of the Bill of Rights and of
the parliamentary law of England" and as a reasonable
basis for inferring "that the framers of the Constitution
meant the same thing by the use of language borrowed
from that source." 103 U. S., at 202.
Prior cases have read the Speech or Debate Clause
"broadly to effectuate its purposes," United States v.
.Johnson, 383 U. S., at 180, and have included within its
reach anything "generally done in a session of the House
by one of its members in relation to the business before
Stockdale extrnsi,·cly reviewed ihe preccdcntH and thrir interplay with the privilege so forcefully recognized in the Bill of Rights
of 1689: "That the freedom of speech, and debate~ or proceedings
in Parliament, ought not to be impeached or queRtioned in any court
or place out of Parliament." 1 W. & M., Scss. 2, c. 2. From these
cases, including Rex v. Creevy, 1 M. & S. 273, 105 Eng. Rrp. 104
(1813); Rex v. Wright, 8 T. R. 292, 101 K. B. 1396 (1799); Rex v.
Abingdon, 1 ESP. 225, N. P. Cas. 337 (1795); Rex v. Williams, 2
Show. K. B. 471, 89 Eng. Rep. 1048, it is apparent that to the
extent English precedent is relevent to the Speech or Debate Clause
there is little, if any, support for Senator Gravel's position with
rc~pect to republication. Parliament reacted to Stockdale v. Ilansard
by adopting the Parliamentary Pnprrs Act of 1840,3 and 4 Viet., c. 9,
which stayed proceeding::; in all ca~rs wherr it eould be shown that
publication was by order of a HouRe of Parli:uncnt and wns a bona
fide report, printed and circulated without malice. Sec generally
C. Wittke, The Ili~tory of Enp;lish Parliamentary Prh·ilcgc (1921).
14
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it." Kilbourn v. 'Phompson, 102 U. S., at 204; United
States v. Johnson, 383 U. S., at 179. Thus, voting by
Members and committee reports are protected; and we·
recognize today-as the Court has recognized before,
Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S., at 204; Tenney v..
Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377-378 (1951)-that a Member's conduct at legislative committee hearings, although
subject to judicial review in various circumstances, as is
legislation itself, may not be made the basis for a civil
or crin1inal judgment against a Member because that
conduct is within the "sphere of legitimate legislative
activity. !d., at 376. 1 "
But the clause has not been extended beyond the legislative sphere. That Senators generally perform certain
acts in their official capacity as Senators does not necessarily make all such acts legislative in nature. Members
of Congress are constantly in touch with the Executive
Branch of the Government and with administrative
agencies-they may cajol and exhort with respect to the
administration of a federal statute-but such conduct,
though generally clone, is not protected legislative activity.
United States v. Johnson decided at least this much.
"No argument is made, nor do we think that it could be
successfully contended, that the Speech or Debate Clause
reaches conduct, such as was involved in the attempt to
influence the Department of Justice, that is in no wise
15 The Comt in Tenney, 341 U. S., at 375-377, was equally clear
that "lrgislative art ivity" is not all-encompas~ing, nor may its limits
be established by the LegislatiYe Branch: "Legislatures may not of
cour:;c acquire power by an unwarranted extension of privilege. The
House of Common'~ claim of power to establish the limits of its
privilege has been little more than a preten~e since Ashby v. White,
2 Ld. Raym. 93 , 3 id., 20. This Court has not hesitated to <m~
tain the rights of private incli\·iduab when it. found Congress was
acting outside its legislative role. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S.
158; Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U. S. 521; compare McGrain v..
Daughaty, 273 U.S. 135, 175."

71-1017 & 71-1025-0PINlON
18

GRAVEL v. UKITED STATES

related to the clue functioning of the legislative process."
383 U. S., at 172. Cf. Burton v. United States, 202 U. S.
444,367-368 (1906).
Legislative acts are not all-encompassing. The heart
of the clause is speech or debate in either House, and insofar as the clause is construed to reach other matters,
they must be an integral part of the deliberative and
communicative processes by which Members participate
in committee and House proceedings with respect to the
consideration and passage or rejection of proposed legislation or with respect to other matters which the Constitution places within the jurisdiction of either House. As
the Court of Appeals put it, the cotirts have extended
the privilege to matters beyond pure speech or debate
in either House, but "only when necessary to prevent indirect impairment of such deliberations." United States
v. Doe, 455 F. 2cl 753, 760 (CAl 1972).
Here private publication by Senator Gravel through
the cooperation of Beacon Press was in no way essential to the deliberations of the House; nor docs questioning as to private publication threaten the integrity
or illClrpenclencc of the House by impermissibly exposing its deliberations to executive influence. The Senator
had conducted his hearings, the record and any report
that was forthcoming were available both to his committee and the House. Neither Congress nor the full
committee ordered or authorized the publication; incleed,
the chairman of the full committee refused to request
it. We can not but conclude that the Senator's arrangements 'vith Beacon Press were not part and parcel of
the legislative process.
There are additional considerations. Article I, ~ 6,
cl. 1, as we have emphasized, does not purport to confer
a general exemption upon Members of Congress from
liability or process in criminal cases. Quite the con-
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trary is true. While the Speech or Debate Clause recognizes speech, voting and other lrgislative acts as
exempt from liability that might other\\·ise attach, it
dors not privilege either Senator or aide to violate an
othcrwi:-e valid criminal law in preparing for or implementing legislative acts. If republication of these classified papers was a crime under an Act of Congress, it
\vas not entitled to immunity under the Speech or Debate Clause. It also appears that the grand jury was
pursuing this very subject in the normal course of a
valid investigation. The Speech or Debate Clause does
not in our vie\\· extend immunity to Rodberg, as a Senator's aide, from testifying before the grand jury about
the arrangement between Senator Gravel and Beacon
Press or about his own participation, if any, in the
a.Jlcged transaction.
III
Similar considerations lead us to disagree with the
Court of Appeals insofar as it fashioned, tentatively at
least. a nonconstitutional testimonial privilege protecting Rodberg from any questioning by the grand jury
concerning the matter of republication of the Pentagon
Papers. This privilege, thought to be similar to that
protecting executive officials from liability for libel, cf.
Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 564 (HJ59), was considered
advisable "to the extent a congressman has responsibility to inform his constituents." But we cannot carry
a judicially fashioned privilege so far as to immunize
criminal conduct or to frustrate the grand jury's inquiry
into whether publication of these classified documents
violated an Act of Congress. The so-ca.Ued executive
privilege has never been applied to shield executive officers from prosecution for crime, the Court of Appeals
was quite sure that third parties were neither immune
from liability nor from testifying about the republica-
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tion matter and we perceive no basis for conferring a
testimonial privilege on Rodberg as the Court of Appeals
seemed to do.

IV
We must finally consider, in the light of the foregoing, whether the protective order entered by the Court
of Appeals is an appropriate regulation of the pending
grand jury proceedings.
Focusing first on paragraph two of the order, we think
the injunction against interrogating Rodberg with respect
to any act, "in the broadest sense," performed by him
within the scope of his employment, overly restricts
the scope of grand jury inquiry. Rodberg's immunity,
testimonial or otherwise, extends only to legislative acts
as to which the Senator himself would be immune. The
grand jury, therefore, if relevant to its investigation
into the possible violations of the criminal law and
absent Fifth Amendment objections, may require from
Rodberg answers to questions relating to his or the
Senator's arrangements, if any, with respect to republication or with respect to third party conduct under
valid investigation by the grand jury, as long as the
questions do not implicate legislative action of the Senator. Neither do we perceive any constitutional or other
privilege that shields Rodberg, any more than any other
witness, from grand jury questions relevant to tracing
the source of obviously highly classified documents that
came into the Senator's possession and arc the basic
subject matter of inquiry in this case.
Because the Speech or Debate Clause privilege applies both to Senator and aide, it appears to us that
paragraph one of the order, alone, would afford ample
protection for the privilege if it forbade questioning any
witness, including Rod berg: ( 1) concerning the Senator's conduct, or the conduct of his aides, at the June 29,
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1971, meeting of the subcommittee; 16 (2) concerningthe motives and purposes behind the Senator's conduct,
or that of his aides, at that meeting; (3) concerning
communications between the Senator and his aides during the term of their employment and related to said
meeting or any other legislative act of the Senator;
( 4) except as proves relevant to investigating possible
third party crime, concerning any act, in itself not criminal, performed by the Senator, or by his aides in the
course of their employment, in preparation for the subcommittee hearing. We leave the final form of such
an order to the Court of Appeals in the first instance, or,.
if that court prefers, to the District Court.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated
and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.

16 Having established that neither the Senator nor Rodberg is
subject to liability for what occurred at the subcommittee hearing,
we perceive no basis for inquiry of either Rodberg or third parties
on this subject. If it prove· material to establish for the record the
fact of publication at the subcommittee hearing, which seems undisputed, the public record of the hearing would appear sufficient
for this purpose. We do not intend to imply, however, that in no
grand jury investigations or criminal trials of third parties may
third-party witnesses be interrogated about legislative acts of Members of Congress.
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alld a residellt fellow at the Institute of Policy Studies,
and Howard Webber, Director of M. I. T. Press. Senator Gravel, as intervenor,' filed motions to quash the
subpoenas and to require the Government to specify
the parbcular questions to be addressed to Roclberg. 2
He asserted that requiring these \Yitnesses to appear and
testify would violate his privilege under the Speech or
Debate Clause of the United States Constitution, Art. I,
§ 6, Cl. 1.
It appeared that on the night of June 29, 1971, Senator Gravel, as Chairman of the Subcommittee on Buildings and Grounds of the Senate Public Works CommitteC', ronvened a meeting of the subcommittee ancl thC're
read extensively from a copy of the Pentagon Papers.
The District Court prrmittrd Srnator Gmvcl to intpn•ene in
n odhrrg's motion to quash the subpoena.
ordering his appearanrr before the grand jur~· and acceptrd motions
from Gravel lo qunsh the snbpoena nnd to ~perif~· the exact nature
of the questions to he n~kccl Hodhrrg. The Govrrnment contested
Gmvel's stnnding to appral the trial court's di~position of these
motions on thr ground thnt, hnd the suhpoenn brcn directed to the
Scnntor, hr could not k11·r appc:llrcl from a denial of a motion to
quash without first rrfu~ing to comply with the subpoenn and being
held in contempt. Un£ted States v. Ryan, 402 U. S ..580 ( 1971);
C'nbblrdick v. United States, 30!) U. S. 328 (1940). Thr Court of
Appmls, United States v. Doe, 455 F. 2cl 753, 756-757 (CAl 1972),
held that becnnse thr subporna was dirrctrcl to third p:utirs, who·
could not be counted on to risk contempt to protert intervenor's
rights, Gravel might be "11owerle~~ to a\·rrt the mischief of theorder" if not permitted to appral, citing Perlman v. United States,
247 U.S. 7, 13 (1918). Thr United States dors not here challenge
the propriety of the appcnl.
2
Dr. Rodberg, who filed hi,; own motion to qua~h the subpoena
clirt>rtiug hiR nppearancr and tr.:,iimon~·. :t.ppran·d :t~ amir-us l"?n·iae
both in the Court of Appeals nnd this Court. Technically, Rodberg
st:1tes, he is :i party 1o 71-102G, in~ofar as the Government appeals
from the protective order c•ntcred b~· the District Comt. However,
~inre Gravel intervened, Rodbcrg docs not press the point. Brief
of Leonard S. Roclberg as Amicus Curiae 2, n. 2.
1

i he procerclin~ on Dr.
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lie then placed the entire 47 volumes of the study 1n
the public record. Rodbcrg had been added to the
Senator's staff earlier in the day and assisted Gravel
in preparing for and cm1ducting the hearing.~ Some
weeks later there 'verc press reports that Gravel had
arranged for the papers to be published by Beacon
Press • and that members of Gravel's staff had talked
with Webber as editor of M. I. T. Press."
The Diskict Court overruled the motions to quash
and to i"pccify questions but entered an order proscribing certain categories of questions. United Stales v.
Doe, 332 F. Supp. 930 (Mass. 1971). The Government's contention that for purposes of applying the
Speech or Debate Clause the courts were free to inquire
into the regularity of the subcommittee meeting was
rejccted. 0 Because the Clause protected all legislative
~The

District Court found "thflt, 'a~ 1wr~onal fl~sistant to mm·ant
Dr. Rodhrrg a~si~trd in preparinl!: for disclo~urc and snhsrqucntl:v disclo~ing to mO\·:mt's collragnrs and constitntents, at a
hearing of the Srnatc Subcommittee on Public Buildim;s nnd Grounds.
1he contents of the so-en !led "Pcntal!;on Pnpers," which were rritical
of the Exrentivr'R conduct in the field of forrign rrlntions.'" United
States Y. Doe, :3:32 F. Rupp. 9:30, 9:-J2 (Mn~~- 1971).
4
Brncon Prrss is a cli1·i~ion of thr Unitari:m Uni1·er~alist Association, which appe:nrcl herr ns amicus curiae in ~upport of the position
t:d;:en by Srna.tor Gmvrl.
5
Gravrl so allrgrd in hi~ motion to intrrvrnc in thr Webbrr
matter nnd to quash thr subpoenn orderinl!; 'Vebber to appear and
teslif)'. App. 15-18.
G The Govrrnmrnt mninbined that Congre~s does not rnjoy unlimited power 1o conduct hu~inrss nnd that. judicial review has often
hrrn exercised to curb ext ra-lru;i~lat ivc incursions by legislative committees, ritinl!; Watkins v. United Statl's, 3.')4 U. S. 178 (Hl57);
McGrain v. Dau(Jherty, 273 U. 8. 135 (1927); Ilrntoff v. !chord,
:31R F. Supp. 1175 \ C'ADC 1970), at lrast where E<uch inrur~ions are
unrebted to a lei!; it imat c lel!;islative purpo~c. It was allrl!;cd that
Gravel hnd "eonYenrcl a sprcinl, unnuthorizrd nnd untimely meeting
of the Srnntr Suhcommittre on Public Works (at midnight on
.Juno 29, 1971), for the purpose of reading the documents and there-

I Gravel],
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acts, it was held to :::hield from iuquiry anything the
Senator did at the subcommittee meeting and "certain
acts done in 11reparation therefor." Id., at 935. The
Senator's privilege also prohibited "inquiry into things
done by Roclberg as the Senator's aide or assistant which
would have been legislative acts, and therefore privileged, if performed by the Senator personally." ld.,
at 937-938. 7 The trial court, however, held the private
republication of the documents was not privileged by
the Speech or Debate C'lause. 8
nfter placed all unread portion~ in the subcommittee rrcord, with
Dr. Rodb0rg soliciting puhlication aftrr the mE'rting." App. 9. Tf1e
District Court rejectNl ihr rontrntion: "Senator Gnwd has suggc~tcd that the availability of fund~ for thr construction and improvemrnt of public buildings and grounds has been affected by the
necessary costs of thE' war in Vietnam and that therrfore thr development and conduct of thr "'ar is proprrly within the concern
of the subcommittee. The court rejrcts the Governmrnt's a rgumrnt without detailed c•on~idcration of the merits of the Senator's
position, on the basi~ of thr grnrral rule restricting inquiry into
matters of legislative purpo~r and OJWmt ions." United States v.
Doe, 332 F. Suw. 930, 935 (Mass. 1971). Cases such as Watkins,
supra, were distinguishrd on the ground that they concerned the
power of Congress under the Constitution: "It has not been suggested by the government that the subcommittee itself is unauthorized, nor that the "·ar in Virtnam is an i8SUE' beyond the purview of
congre::;sional debate and artion. Also, the individu:1l rights at
stake in these proceedings arc not those of a witness before a rongressional committee or of a subjrct of a committee's investigntion,
but only those of a congressman and member of his personal staff
who claim 'intimidation by the executive.'" !d., at 73G.
7
The District Court thought that Rod berg could be questioned
concerning his own condurt prior to joining the Scna tor';; stafT and
concerning the activitie~ of third p:1rties with whom Rodberg and
Gravel dealt. United States v. Doe, 332 F. Supp. 930, 934 (Mass.
1971).
8 The protective order entered by the District Court provided as
follows:
"(1) No witness before the grand jury currently investigating thc
release of the Pentagon Papers may be questioned about Senator
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The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the motions to quash but modified the protective order to
reflect its own views of the scope of the congressional
privilege. United States v. Doe, 455 F. 2d 753 (CAl
1972) . Agreeing that Senator and aide were one for
the purposes of the Speech or Debate Clause and that
the Clause foreclosed inquiry of both Senator a.ncl aide
with respect to legislative acts, the Court of AP11eals
also viewed the privilege as barring direct inquiry of
the Senator or his aide, but not of third parties, as to
the sources of the Senator's information used in performing legislative duties.n Although it did not consider private republication by the Senator or Beacon
Press to be protected by the Constitution, the Court
of Appeals apparently held that neither Senator nor aide
could be questioned about it because of a common law
privilege akin to the judicially created immunity of executive officers from liability for libel contained in a
news release issued in the course of their normal duties.
Sec Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 564 (1959). This privilege, fashioned by the Court of Appeals, would not
Mike Gravel's conduct at a merting of the Subcommittee on Public
Buildings and Grounds on June 29, 1971, nor about things done by
the Senator in preparation for and intimately related to said meeting.
"(2) Dr. Leonard S. Rodbcrg may not be qurstioned about his own
actions on June 29, 1971, after having been engaged as a member
of Senator Gravel's personal staff to the eA"tent that they were done
at the Senator's direction either at a meeting of the Subcommittee
on Public Buildings and Grounds or in preparation for and intimntcly related to said meeting."
0 The Court of Appeals thought third parties could be questioned
as to their own conduct rrgarding the Pentagon Papers, "including their dealings with intervenors or his aides." United States v.
Doe. 455 F. 2d 753, 761 (CAl 1972). The court found llo mr rit
in the claim that such parties should be shielded from questioning
under the Speech or Debate Clause concerning their own wrongful
acts, even if such questioning may bring the Senator's conduct into.
question. Id., at 758, n. 2.
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protect third parties from similar inquiries before the
grand jury. As modified by the Court of Appeals, the
protective order to be observed by prosecution and grand
,1ury was:
" ( 1) No witness before the grand jury currently
investigating the release of the Pentagon Papers
may be questioned about Senator Mike Gravel's
conduct at a meeting of the Subcommittee on Public Buildings and Grounds on June 29, 1071, nor,
if the questions are directed to the motives or purposes behind the Senator's conduct at that meeting, about any communications with him or with
his aides rega.rding the activities of the Senator
or his aides during the period of their employment,
in preparation for and related to said meeting.
"(2) Dr. Leonard S. Rodberg may not be questioned about his own actions in the broadest sense,
including observations and communications, oral or
written, by or to him, or coming to his attention
while being interviewed for, or after having been
engaged as a member of Senator Gravel's personal
staff to the extent that they were in the course
of his employment."
The United States petitioned for certiorari cha.llenging the ruling that ajdes and other persons may not
be questioned with respect to legislative acts a11d that
an aide to a Member of Congress has a common-law
privilege not to testify before a grand jury with respect
to private republication of materials introduced into
a subcommittee record. Senator Gravel also petitioned
for certiorari seeking reversal of the Court of Appeals
insofar as it held private republication unprotected by
the Speech or Debate Clause and asserting that the protective order of the Court of Appeals too na.rrowly
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protected against inquiries that a grand jury could direct
We granted both petitions. 405 U. S.
916 (1972).
I
to third parties.

Because the claim is that a Member's aide shares
the Member's constitutional privilege, we consider first
whether and to what extent Senator Gravel himself is
exempt from process or inquiry by a grand jury investigating the commission of a crim.e. Our frame of reference is Art. I, ~ 6, cl. 1, of the Constitution:
"The Senators and Representatives shall receive
a Compensation for their Services, to be ascertained
by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United
States. They shall in all Cases, except Treason,
Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from
Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of
their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned
in any other Place."
The last sentence of the clause provides Members of
Congress with two distinct privileges. Except in cases
of "Treason , Felony and Breach of the Peace," the clause
shie-lds Members from arrest while attending or traveling
to and from a session of their House. History reveals,
and prior cases so hold, that this part of the clause
exempts MC'mbers from arrest in civil cases only.
"When the Constitution was adopted, arrests in civil
suits were common in America. It is only to such arrests that the provision applies." Long v. Ansell, 293
U. S. 76, 83 (1934) (footnote omitted). "Since . . .
the terms treason , felony and breach of the peace, as
used in the constitutional provision relierl upon, excepts from the operation of privilege all criminal offenses,
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the conclusion results that the claim of privilege of
exemption from arrE'st and sentence wa.s without
merit . . . . " Williamson v. United States, 207 U. S.
425, 446 ( 1908) .10 Nor does freedom from arrest confer immunity on a Member from service of process as
a defendant in civil matters, Long v. Ansell, supra, at
82- 83, or as a witness in a criminal case. "The Constitution gives to every man, charged with an offense,
the benefit of compulsory process, to secure the attendance of his witnesses. I do not know of any privilege
to exempt members of Congress from the service, or
the obligations, of a subpoena, in such cases." United
States v. Cooper, 4 Dall. 340, 341 ( 1800) (per Chase, J.,
sitting on Circuit). It is, therefore, sufficiently plain
that the constitutional freedom from arrest does not exempt Members of Congress from the operation of the
ordinary criminal laws, even though imprisonment may
prevent or interfere with the performance of their duties
as Members. Williamson v. United States, supra; cf.
Burton v. United States, 202 U. S. 344 (1906). Indeed, implicit in the narrow scope of the privilege of
freedom from arrest is, as Jefferson noted, the judgment
that legislators ought not to stand above the law they
create but ought generally to be bound by it as are
ordinary persons. Jefferson, Manual of Parliamentary
Practice, S. Doc. No. 91- 2 437 (1971).
In recognition, no doubt, of the force of this part of
Clause 6, Senator Gravel disavows any assertion of gen10 Williamson , United States Congressmnn, had been found guilty
of conRpiring to commit subornation of perjury in connection with
proceedings for the purchnsc of public lnnd. He objected to the
court passing sentence upon him and pnrtirularly protested that any
imprisonment would deprive him of his ronstitutionnl right to "go
to, attend at and return from the cusHing session of Congress."
Williamson v. United States, 207 U. S. 425, 432-433 (1908). The
Court rejected the contention that the Speech or Debate Clnuse freed
legi ·lators from accountability for criminal conduct.
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eral immunity from the criminal law. But he points
out that the last portion of Clause 6 affords Members
of Congress another vital privilege-they may not be
questioned in any other place for any speech or debate
in either House. The claim is not that while one part
of Clause 6 generally permits prosecutions for treason r
felony and breach of the peace, another part nevertheless broadly forbids them. Rather, his insistence is
that the Speech or Debate Clause at the very least protects him from criminal or civil liability and from questioning elsewhere than in the Senate, with respect to
the events occurring at the subcommittee hearing at
which the Pentagon Papers were introduced into the
public record. To us this claim is incontrovertible.
The Speech or Debate Clause was designed to assure a
coequal branch of the government wide freedom of
speech, debate and deliberation without intimidation or
threats from the Executive Branch. It thus protects
Members against prosecutions that directly impinge
upon or threaten the legislative process. We have no
doubt that Senator Gravel may not be made to answer-either in terms of questions or in terms of defending himself from prosecution-for the events that
occurred at the subcommittee meeting. Our decision
is made easier by the fact that the United States appears to have abandoned whatever position it took to·
the contrary in the lower courts.
Even so, the United States strongly urges that because the Speech or Debate Clause confers a privilege
only upon "Senators and Representatives," Rodberg
himself has no valid claim to constitutional immunity
from grand jury inquiry. In our view, both courts
below correctly rejected this position. We agree with
the Court of Appeals that for the purpose of construing
the privilege a Member and his aide are to be "treated
as one," United States v. Doe, 455 F. 2d 753, 761 (CAl
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1072); or, as the District Court put it: The "Speech or
Debate Clause prohibits inquiry into things done by
Dr. Rodberg as the Senator's agent or assistant which
would have been legislative acts, and therefore privileged, if performed by the Senator personally." United
States Y. Doe, 332 F. Supp. 930, 937-938 (Mass. 1971).
Both courts recognized \',:hat the Senate of the United
States urgently presses here: that it is literally impossible, in view of the complexities of the modern legislative process, with Congress almost constantly in session and matters of legislative concern constantly proliferating, for Members of Congress to perform their
legislative tasks without the help of aides and assistants;
that the day-to-day work of such aides is so critical to
the Members' performance that they must be treated
as the latters' alter ego; and that if they are not so
recognized, the central role of the Speech or Debate
Clause-to prevent intimidation of legislators by the
executive and accountability before a possibly hostile
judiciary, United States Y. Joh11son, 383 U. S. 160, 181will inevitably be diminished and frustrated.
The Court has already embraced similar views in Barr
v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959), "·here in immunizing the
Acting Director of the Office of Rent Stabilization from
liability for a.n alleged libel contained in a press relca~c,
the Court held that the executive privilege recogni;,cd in
prior cases could not be restricted to those of cabinet
rank. As stated by Mr. Justice Harlan , "the privilege'
is not a badge or emolument of exalted office, but n.n
expression of a policy designed to aiel in the effective
functioning of Government. The complexities and magnitude of governmental activity have become so great
that there must be a delegation and redelegation, and
we cannot say that these functions become less important simply because they arc exercised by officers of
lo\\'er rank in the executive hierarchy." !d., at 572- 573_
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It is true that the clause itself mentions only "Senators and Representatives," but prior cases have plainly
not taken a literalistic approach in applying the privilege. The clause also speaks only of "Speech or Debate," but the Court's consistent approach has been that
to confine the protection of the Speech or Debate Clause
to words spoken in debate would be an unacceptably
narrow view. Committee reports, resolutions, and the
act of voting arc equally covered; "[iln short, ...
things generally done in a session of the House by one
of its members in relation to the business before it."
Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S.168, 204 (1880), quoted
with approval in United States v. Jolmson, 383 U. S.
169, 179 (1966). Rather than giving the clause a cramped
construction, the Court has sought to implement its
fundamental purpose of freeing the legislator from executive and judicial oversight that realistically threaten
to control his conduct as a legislator. We have little
doubt that we are neither exceeding our judicial powers
nor mistakenly construing the Constitution by holding
that the Speech or Debate Clause applies not only to a
Member but also to his aides insofar as the conduct of
the latter would be a protected legislative act if performed by the Member himself.
Nor cau we agree with the United States that our
conclusion is foreclosed by Kilbow·n Y. Thonl]Json, supra,
Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U. S. 82 (1967), and Powell Y. McConnack, 395 U. S. 48G (1969), where the
speech or debate privilege was held unavailable to certain House and committee employees. Those cases do
not hold that persons other than Members of Congress
are beyond the protection of the clause when they perform or aid in the performance of legislative acts. In
Kilbourn, the Speech or Debate Clause protected HouBc
Members who had adopted a rcsolu tion authorizing
Kilbourn's arrest; that act was clearly legislative in na-
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ture. But the resolution was subject to judicial reviev,·
insofar as its execution impinged on a citizen's rights as
it did there. That the House could with impunity ordetan unconstitutional arrest afforded no protection for
those who made the arrest. The Court quoted with approval from Stockdale v. Hansard, 9 Ad. & E. 1, 112 K. B.
1112 (1839): "So if the Speaker by authority of the
House order an illegal act, though that authority shall
exempt him from question, his order shall no more
justify the person who executed it than King Charles'
\varrant for levying ship-money could justify his revenue officer." 103 U.S., at 102. 11 The Speech or Debate
Clause could not be construed to immunize an illegal
arrest even though directed by an immune legislative
act. The Court was careful to point out that the
Members themselves were not implicated in the actual
arrest, id., at 200, and, significantly enough, reserved the
question whether there might be circumstances in which
"there may . . . be things done, in the one House or
the other, of an extraordinary character, for which the
members who take part in the act may be held legally
responsible." 103 U. S., at 204 (emphasis added).
Dombrowski v. Eastland, supm, is little different in
principle. The Speech or Debate Clause there protected
11 In Kilbourn, 103 U. S., at 198, the Court noted a second exmnple, used by Mr. Justice Coleridge in Stockdale, 9 Ad. & E., at
225-226, 112 K. B., at 1196-1197: " 'Let me suppo~e, by way of
illustration, an extreme case; the House of Common~ resolves that
any one wearing a dress of a particular manufacture is gnilty of a
breach of privilege, and ordrr~ the arrest of such per~ons by the
constable of the parish. An arrest i~ made and action brought, to
which the order of the House is pleaded as a ju~tification. . . . In
such a case as the one suppo~ed, the plaintiff'~ counsel would insist
on the distinction between power and privilege; and no lawyer can
seriously doubt that it exists: but the argument confound~ them, and
forbids us to enquire, in any particular case, whether it ranges
under the one or the other. I can find no principle which sanctions this.' "
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a Senator, who was also a subcommittee chairman , but
not the subcommittee counsel. The record contained no·
evidence of the Senator's involvement in any activity that
could result in liability, 387 U. S., at 84, whereas the
committee counsel was charged with conspiring with
state officials to carry out an illegal seizure of records
which the committee sought for its own proceedings.
Ibid. The committee counsel was deemed protected to·
some extent by legislative privilege, but it did not shield
him from answering as yet unproved charges of conspiring to violate the constitutional rights of private parties.
Unlawful conduct of this kind the Speech or Debate
Clause simply did not immunize.
Powell v. McCormick reasserted judicial power to determine the validity of legislative actions impinging on
individual rights-there the illegal exclusion of a representative-elect- and to afford relief against House aides
seeking to implement the invalid resolutions. The Members themselves were dismissed from the case because
shielded by the Speech or Debate Clause both from liability for their illegal legislative act and from having to
defend themselves with respect to it. As in Kilbourn,
the Court did not reach the question "whether under the
Speech or Debate Clause petitioners would be entitled to
maintain this action solely against the members of Congress where no agent participated in the challenged action
and no other remedy was available." 395 U. S., at 506
n. 26.
None of these three cases adopted the simple proposition that immunity was unavailable to House or committee employees because they were not Representatives
or Senators; rather, immunity was unavailable because·
they engaged in illegal conduct which was not entitled to
Speech or Debate Clause protection. The three cases reflect a decidedly jaundiced view towards extending the
clause so as to privilege illegal or unconstitutional con-·
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duct beyond that essential to foreclose executive control
of legislative speech or debate and associated matters such
as voting and committee reports and proceedings. In
Kilbourn, the Sergeant-at-Arms was executing a legislative order, the issuance of which fell within the Speech or
Debate Clause; in Eastland, the committee counsel was
gathering information for a hearing; and in Powell, the
Clerk and Doorkeeper were merely carrying out directions
that were protected by the Speech or Debate Clause. In
each case, protecting the rights of others may have to
some extent frustrated a planned or completed legislative
act; but relief could be afforded without proof of a legislative act or the motives or purposes underlying such an
act. No threat to legislative independence was posed,
and Speech or Debate Clause protection did not attach.
None of this, as we sec it, involves distinguishing between a Senator and his personal aides with respect to
legislative immunity. In Kilbourn-type situations, both
aide and Member should be immune with respect to committee and House action leading to the illegal resolution.
So too in Eastland, as in this case, senatorial aides should
enjoy immunity for helping a Member conduct committee
hearings. On the other hand, no prior case has held
that Members of Congress would be immune if they
execute an im·alicl resolution by themselves carrying out
an illegal arrest, or if, in order to secure information for
a hearing, themselves seize the property or invade the·
privacy of a citizen. Keithcr they nor their aides should
be immune from liability or questioning in such circumstances. Such acts are no more essential to legislating
than the conduct held unprotected in United Slates v.
Johnson, 383 U.S. 160 (1966).'~
1

~

Rcnator Gra\·PI is willing to :1~~umc that if he per~onally had
the Pentagon Papers, nnd that act. wcrr n f'rimr, he eould
be prosecuted, as f'ould aid<'~ or other assistant~ who participated
in the theft. Cousolidated Brief of Srnator G r:n·cl 93.

"~tolen"
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The United States fears the abuses that history reveals have occurred when legislators are invested with
the power to relieve others from the operation of otherwise valid civil and criminal laws. But these abuses, it
seems to us, arc for the most part obviated if the privilege
applicable to the aide is viewed, as it must be, a!' the
privilege of the Senator, and invocable only by the Senator or by the aide on the Senator's behalf,"' and if in all
events the privilege available to the aide is confined to
those services that would be immune legislative conduct
if performed by the Senator himself. This view places
beyond the Speech or Debate Clause a variety of services
characteristically performed by aides for Members of
Congress, even though within the scope of their employment. It likewise provides no protection for criminal
conduct threatening the security of the person or property
of others, whether performed at the direction of the
Senator in preparation for or in execution of a legislative
act or done without his knowledge or direction. Neither
does it immuni"'e Senator or aide from testifying at trials
or grand jmy proceedings involving third-party crimes
where the questions do not require testimony about or
impugn a legislative act. Thus our refusal to distinguish
between Senator and aide in applying the Speech or Debate Clause does not mean that Rodberg is for all purposes exempt from grand jury questioning.
II

\Ve are convinced also that the Court of Appeals correctly determined that Senator Gravel's alleged arrangement with Beacon Press to publish the Pentagon Papers
was not protected speech or debate within the meaning
of Art. I, § 6, cl. 1, of the Constitution.
:' It followH thnt nn nid<''s ('!aim of pri,·ilegc rnn be repudiated and
thus waived by the Senator.
1
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Historically the English legislative privilege was not
viewed as protecting republication of an otherwise immune libel on the floor of the House. Stockdale v. Hansard, 9 Ad. & E. 1, 114, 112 K. B. 1112, 1156 (1839),
recognized that "for speeches made in Parliament by a
member to the prejudice of any other person, or hazardous
to public peace, that member enjoys complete impunity."
But it was clearly stated that "if the calumnious or
inflamatory speeches should be reported and published,
the law will attach responsibility on the publisher." 11
This was accepted in Kilbourn v. Thompson as a "sound
statement of the legal effect of the Bill of Rights and of
the parliamentary law of England" and as a reasonable
basis for inferring "that the framers of the Constitution
meant the same thing by the use of language borrowed
from that source." 103 U. S., at 202.
Prior cases have read the Speech or Debate Clause
"broadly to effectuate its purposes," United States v .
.Johnson, 383 U. S., at 180, and have included within its
reaeh anything "generally done in a session of the House
by one of its members in relation to the business before
14
StockdaLe extrn~ively reviewed the precedents and their interplay with the privilege so forcefully rrrognized in the Bill of Rights
of 1689: "ThaL the freedom of speech, and de bat rs or proceedings
in Parliament, ought not to he impeached or qurstioned in any court
or place out of Parliament." 1 W. & M., SesR. 2, c. 2. From the~e
rases, including Rex v. Creevy, 1 M. & S. 273, 105 Eng. Rep. 104
(1813); Rex v. Wright, 8 T. H. 292, 101 K. B. 1396 (1799); Rex v.
Abingdon, 1 ESP. 225, N. P. Cas. 337 (1795); Rex v. Williams, 2
Show. K. B. 471, 89 Eng. Rep. 1048, it is apparent that to the
extent English precedent i~ relevrnt to the Speech or Debate Clause
there is little, if any, support for Sen:1lor Gravrl's po~ition with
re~prct to republication. Parliament reactrd to Stockdale v. Ilansard
by adopting the Parliamentary Paprrs Aet of 1840, 3 and 4 Viet., c. 9,
which stayed proceedings in all cat~e::> where it could be shown that
publication was br order of a House of Parliament and was a bona
fide report, printed and circulated without malice. Sec generally
C. Wittke, The History of English Parliamentary Privilege (1921).

71-1017 & 71-1026-0PINION
GRAVEL v. UNITED STATES

17

it." Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S., at 204; Un-ited
States v. Johnson, 383 U. S., at 170. Thus, voting by
Members and committee reports are protected; and we
recognize today--as the Court has recognized before,
Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S., at 204; Tenney v.
Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367, 377-378 ( 1951)-that a Member's conduct at legislative committee hearings, although
subject to judicial review in various circumstances, as is
legislation itself, may not be made the basis for a civil
or criminal judgment against a Member because that
conduct is within the "sphere of legitimate legislative·
activity." !d., at 376. 1 "
But the clause has not been extended beyond the legislative sphere. That Senators generally perform certain
acts in their official capacity as Senators does not necessarily make all such acts legislative in nature. Members
of Congress are constantly in touch with the Executive
Branch of the Government and with administrative
agencies-they may cajole, and exhort with respect to the
administration of a federal statute-but such conduct,
though generally done, is not protected legislative activity.
United States v. Johnson decided at least this much.
"No argument is made, nor do we think that it could be
successfully contended, that the Speech or Debate Clause
reaches conduct, such as was involved in the attempt to
influence the Department of Justice, that is in no wise
1

~ The Court in Tenney, 341 U. S., at 376-377, was equally clear
that "legislative activity" i~ not all-encompa~sing, nor may its limits
be e;;tablished by tlw Legislative Branch: "Lrgislaturcs may not of
course acquire power by an unwarranted extension of' privilege. The
House of Common's claim of power to establish the limits of its
privilege has been lit lie more than a pretcn~e :;incc Ashby v. White,
2 Ld. Raym. 938, 3 id., 20. This Court has not hesitated to sustain the rights of private individuals when it found Congre~;; was
acting outside its legislative role. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S.
168; Marshall v. G01·don, 243 U. S. 521; compare McGrain v.
Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 176."
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related to the due functioning of the legislative process."
383 U. S., at 172. Cf. Burton v. United States, 202 U. S.
444, 367-368 (1906).
Legislative acts are not all-encompassing. The heart
of the clause is speech or debate in either House, and insofar as the clause is construed to reach other matters,
they must be an integral part of the deliberative and
communicative processes by which Members participate
in committee and House proceedings with respect to the
consideration and passage or rejection of proposed legislation or with respect to other matters which the Constitution places within the jurisdiction of either House. As
the Court of Appeals put it, the courts have extended
the privilege to matters beyond pure speech or debate
in either House, but "only when necessary to prevent indirect impairment of such deliberations." United States·
v. Doe, 455 F. 2d 753. 760 (CAl 1972).
Here private publication by Senator Gravel through
the cooperation of Beacon Press was in no ·way essential to the deliberations of the House; nor docs questioning as to private publication thrcate11 the integrity
or indPpendence of the Hou c by impermissibly exposing its deliberations to executive influence. The Senator·
had conducted his hearings, tho record and any report
that was forthcoming were available both to his committee and the House. Insofar as \\'C arc advised. neither
Congress nor tho full committee ordered or authorized
tho publication."; \Vc cannot but conclude that the I
'" Tho ~olr eon~titution:d rlaim :t~:'Prtrd hr rr j, ba,rd on the
Sprr rh or Drb;tt r Clau~r. Wr ltrrcl not addrr,.:.• j,~ur" 1\'hic·h mty
ari.• r 1\'hrn Cong;rc•s.' or rithrr IIou.• r, :1~ di,tinp;ui~'<hrd from :1 f'inp;lr
~T e mb rr. ordrr~ thr public;tlion and j or publil' di"tribution of f•ommittcc hraring;". report" or other matcri:tk Of rour.• r, Art. I , ~ 5,
Cl. a. require:' thut each lTOU:'(' "kef'P a .)onrn:d of it~ Prol'eeding-•,
nnd from limo to tirnr publish the f':tnw, c•xc·ppling- ~ u<·h l':trf~ ns
mny in thrir .Judl);mrnt require Sccrcf·y .... " Thi~ Cl::tn~<' h:t" not

~
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Senator's arrangements with Beacon Press were not part
and parcel of the legislative process.
There are additional considerations. Article I, § 6,
cl. 1, as '"e have emphasized, does not purport to confer
a general exemption upon Members of Congress from
liability or process in criminal cases. Quite the contra.ry is true. While the Speech or Debate Clause recognizes speech, voting and other legislative acts as
exempt from liability that might otherwise attach, it
docs not privilege either Sena.t or or aide to violate an
otherwise valid criminal law in preparing for or implementing legislative acts. If republication of these classified papers "·as a crime under an Act of Congress, it
\vas not entitled to immunity under the Speech or Debate Clause. It a.lso appears that the grand jury was
pursuing this very subject in the normal course of a
valid investigation. The Speech or Debate Clause does
not in our view extend immunity to Rodberg, as a Senator's aide, from testifying before the grand jury about
the arrangement bebyeen Senator Gravel and Beacon
Press or about his own participation, if any, in the
alleged transaction, . so long as legislative acts of the
Senator arc not impugned.

III
Similar considerations lead us to disagree with the
Court of Appeals insofar as it fashioned, tentatively at
least, a nonconstitutiona1 testimonial privilege protecting Rodberg from any questioning by the grand jury
concerning the matter of republication of the Pentagon
Papers. This privilege, thought to be similar to that
protecting executive officials from liability for libel, cf.
bc•cn the subject of cxtcn~i,·c jndieinl cxmnin:li ion. Sec Field v.
Clarl.-, 143 U. S. G-19, 570-671 (1802); United Statrs v. Ballin, 144
U.S . 1, 4 (1892).

I
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Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 564 (1959), was considered
advisable "to the extent a congressman has responsibility to inform his constituents." But we cannot carry
a judicially fashioned privilege so far as to immunize
criminal conduct proscribed by an Act of Congress or
to frustrate the grand jury's inquiry into whether publication of these classified documents violated a federal criminal statute. The so-called executive privilege
has never been applied to shield executive officers
from prosecution for crime, the Court of Appeals "·as
quite sure that third parties were neither immune
from liability nor from testifying about the republication matter and we perceive no basis for conferring a
testimonial privilege on Rodberg as the Court of Appeals
seemed to do.

IV
We must finally consider, in the light of the foregoing, whether the protective order entered by the Court
of Appeals is an appropriate regulation of the pending
grand jury proceedings.
Focusing first on paragraph two of the order, we think
the injunction against interrogating Rodbcrg with respect
to any act, "in the broadest sense," performed by him
within the scope of his employment, overly restricts
the scope of grand jury inquiry. Rodberg's immunity,
testimonial or otherwise, extends only to legislative acts
as to which the Senator himself would be immune. The
grand jury, therefore, if relevant to its investigation
into the possible violations of the criminal law and
absent Fifth Amendment objections, may require from
Rodberg answers to questions relating to his or the
Senator's arrangements, if any, with respect to republication or with respect to third party conduct under
valid investigation by the grand jury, as long as the
questions do not implicate legislative action of the Senator. Neither do we perceive any constitutional or other
privilege that shields Rodberg, any more than any other
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witness, from grand jury questions relevant to tracing
the source of obviously h.ighly classified documents that
came into the Senator's possession and are the basic
subject matter of inqu.iry in this case, as long as no }
legislative act is implicated by the questions.
Because the Speech or Debate Clause privilege applies both to Senator and aide, it appears to us that
paragraph one of the order, alone, would afford ample·
protection for the privilege if it forbade questioning any
witness, including Rod berg: ( 1) concerning the Senator's conduct, or the conduct of his aides, at the June 29,
1971, meeting of the subcommittee; 17 (2) concerning
the motives and purposes behind the Senator's conduct,
or that of his aides, at that meeting; (3) concerning
communications between the Senator and his aides during the term of their employment and related to said
meeting or any other leg~slative act of the Senator;
( 4) except as it proves relevant to investigating possible 1
third party crime, concerning any act, in itself not criminal, performed by the Senator, or by his aides in the
course of their employment, in preparation for the subcommittee hearing. We leave the final form of such
an order to the Court of Appeals in the first instance, or,
if that court prefers, to the District Court.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated
and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
17
Ha.viiJg established that neither the Seuator nor Roclberg is
subject to liability for what occurred at the subcommittee hearing,
we perceive no bn sis for inquiry of either Roclberg or third parties
on this subject. If it proves material to establish for the record the
fact of publication at the subcommittee hearing, which seems undisputed, the public record of the henring would appear sufficient
for this purpose. We do not intend to imply, however, that in no
grand jury investigations or criminal trials of third parties may
third-party witnesses be interrogated about legislative acts of Members of Congress.

7

Rider A, p. 20, Gravel 6/13/72

Neither do we perceive any constitutional or other privilege that
shields Rodberg from grand jury questions relevant to determining
whether a third party crime had been committed in obtaining the
highly classified documents that are the basic subject matter of
inquiry in this case, provided that no legislative act is implicated
by the questions.

--------

------------Rider

( 4) . except where there is probable cause to believe a third

party crime has been committed, [questions may be asked]
concerning any act, 1n itself not criminal, performed by the
Senator or by his aides 1n the course at their employment 1n
preparation for the subcommittee hearing.
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and a resident fellow at the Institute of Policy Studies,
and Ho>vard Webber, Director of M. I. T. Press. Senator Gravel, as intervenor/ filed motions to quash the
subpoenas and to require the Government to specify
the particular questions to be addressed to Rodberg."
He asserted that requiring these " ·it11esse to appear and
testify would violate his privilege under the Speech or
Debate Clause of the United States Constitution, Art. I,
~ 6, Cl. 1.
It appeared that on the night of June 29, 1971, Senator Gravel, as Chairma11 of the Subcommittee on Buildings and Grounds of the Senate Public \Yorks Committee, C'Onvened a meeting of the c::ubcommittee and there
read extensively from a copy of the Pentagon Papers.
1 The Distrirt Court p<'rmitted S<.'nntor Gravel to intervene in
the pror<.'<.'ding on Dr. Rodlwrg's motion to quash the subporna
ordering his appraranrc before the grand jury and accepted motion~
from Gravel to quash the subpoena and to sperif~· the exact natum
of the questions to be nskrd Rodbcrg. Th<' Gov<'rnment contested'
Gmnl's stnnding to nppral the trinl conrt'~ disposition of these
motions on the ground that. h:1d the r-;ubpo<'n:l been dircrtrd to the
Senator, he could 11ot hn,·r nppe;drcl from a d<'nial of n. motion to
quash without fir~t rrfu~ing to comply with the subpoena and being
hrld in rontempt. United States v. Ryan, 402 U. S. 530 (1971);
('obbledick \'. United States, 309 U. S. 323 ( 1940). The Court of
Appeals, United States v. Doe, 4.55 F. 2cl 753, 756-757 (CAl 1972),
held thnt becanse thr subporna war-; dirrrtrd to third part irs, who·
could not be counted on to ri~k rontrmpt to protect intervenor's
rights, Gravel might he "poll"erlc~~ to anrt thr mischirf of the
order" if not prrmittrcl to llPJWal. rit ing Perlman v. United Statl's,.
247 U.S. 7. 1:3 (1918). The United State~ do<'~ not hrrr rhallrnge
the propriety of the appeal.
~Dr. Rodberg, who filed his own motion to f)ua sh th<' subpoem
dirrctiug hi~ n]lpraranrr and tr:<timon~· , appP;trt•rl :t,; a111ir·1ts curiae
both in the Court of Appral~ nnd thiH Court. Technically , Rodberg
st:1tcs, he is u party to 71-1026 , in~ofnr as the Gonrnmrnt uppcals
from the protecti,·r order rntrred b~· th<' District Court. Howe,·er,
::;inre Gravel intrrvencd, Rod berg doe,; not prrss the point. Brief
of Leonard S. Rodberg as Amicus Cwiae 2, n. 2.
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He then placed the entire 47 volumes of the study in
the public record. Rodberg had been added to the
Senator's staff earlier in the day and assisted Gravel
in preparing for and conducting the hearing.'~ Some
weeks later there >Yere press reports that Gravel had
arranged for the papers to be published by Beacon
Press 1 and that members of Gravel's staff had talked
with Webber as editor of M. I. T. Press."
The District Court overruled the motions to quash
and to specify questions but entered an order proscribing certain categories of questions. United States v.
Doe, 332 F. Supp. 930 (Mass. 1971). The Government's contention that for purposes of applying the
Speech or Debate Clause the courts were free to inquire
into the regularity of the subcommittee meeting was
rejected.() Because the Clause protected all legislative
"The District Court found "th~t, 'as prrsonal n~sistnnt to movant
fGraYell, Dr. Rodberg assisted in preparing for discloRure and subRequently disclosing to mo1·nnt's collcngurs nne! constitutrnts, at a
hearing of the Senntc Subcommittee on Public Buildings ~nd Grounds,
the contents of the so-cnllecl "Pentagon Pnpers," which were critical
of the Executive'~ conduct in the field of foreign rrl11tions.'" United
Sta.tes v. Dne, 332 F. 8upp. 930, 932 (M~s s. 1971) .
• Brncon Press is n cliYision of thr Unit:ninn Univerf'alist Association, which appenred here as arnicus curiae in support of the position
taken by Senator Gravel.
5 Gravel so alleged in his motion to intervrne in the Webbrr
matter and to quash 1hr subpoena ordering Wcbbrr to appear and
testify. App. 15-18.
G The Govrrnmrnt mnint:1ined th:1t Congress docs not enjoy unlimited power to conduct busineRs :1ncl that judicial revirw has often
been exercised to curb cxtrn-legi~l:1tive incursions by legislative committees, citing Watkins v. United States, 354 U. S. 178 (1957);
McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135 (1927); IIentofJ v. !chord,
318 F. Supp. 1175 (C'ADC 1970), :1t lc:1st whrre Buch incursions arcunrelated to a legitimate legislative purpo~f'. It was allrged that
Gravel hnd "rom·enrd a sprcial, unauthorized nnd untimely meeting
of the Sen:1te Subcommittre on Public Works (at midnight on
June 29, 1971), for the purpose of rending t.he documents and there-
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acts, it was held to shield from inquiry anything the
Senator did at the subcommittee meeting and "certain
acts done in preparation therefor." I d., at 935. The
Senator's privilege also prohibited "inquiry into things
done by Rodberg as the Senator's aide or assistant which
would have been legislative acts, and therefore privileged, if performed by the Senator personally." !d.,
at 937-938. 7 The trial court, however, held the private
republication of the documents was not privileged by
the Speech or Debate Clause. 8
after placed all unread portions in the subcommittee record, with
Dr. Rodberg soliciting publication af1er thr meeting'' App. 9. Tlie
District Court rejected the contention: "Senator Grnvel has suggested that the availability of funds for the construction and improvement of public buildings and grounds hns bern nffccted by the
necessary costs of the war in Vietnam and that therefore the devrlopment and conduct of the war is properly within the concern
of the subrommittee. The court rejects the Government's argument without detailed consideration of the merits of the Senator's
po ition, on the basis of the general rule restricting inquiry into
matters of legislative purpose and operations." United States v.
Doe, 332 F. Supp. 930, 9:35 (Mnss. 1971). Cases such as Watkins,
supra, were distingui~hed on the ground that they concerned the
power of Congress under the Constitution: "It has not been suggested by the government that the subcommittee itself is unauthorized, nor that the war in Vietnam is an issue beyond the purview of
congressional debate and action. Also, the individual rights at
stake in these proceedings arc not those of a witness before a con~rrssional committee or of a subject of a committee's investigation,
but only those of a congressman ::mel member of his personal staff
who claim 'intimidation by the executive.'" I d., at 736.
7 The District Court thought that Roclbcrg could be questioned
concerning his own conduct prior to joining the Senator's staff and
concerning the activities of third parties with whom Roclbcrg and
Gravel dealt. United States v. Doe, 332 F. Supp. 930, 934 (Mass.
1971).
8 The protective order entered by the District Court provided as
follows:
"(1) No witness before the grand jury currently investigating the
release of the Pentagon Papers may be questioned about Senator
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The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the motions to quash but modified the protective order to
reflect its own views of the scope of the congressional
privilege. United States Y. Doe, 455 F. 2d 753 (CAl
1972). Agreeing that Senator and aide were one for
the purposes of the Speech or Debate Clause and that
the Clause foreclosed inquiry of both Senator and aide
with respect to legislative acts, the Court of Appeals
also viewed the privilege as barnn direct in uir "-'Of
the en a tor or us a1 e, u not o t 11r parties, ~
the sources of the Senator's information used in performin g legislative dutics. 0 Although it did not consider private republication by the Senator or Beacon
Press to be protected by the Constitution, the Court
of Appeals apparently held that neither Senator nor aidecould be questioned about it because of a common law
privilege akin to the judicially created immunity of executive officers from liability for libel contained in a
news release issued in the course of their normal duties.
See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 564 (1959). This privilege, fashioned by the Court of Appeals, would not
Mike Gravel's conduct at a meeting of the Subcommittee on Public
Buildings and Grounds on June 29, 1971 , nor about things done by
the Senator in preparation for and intimately related to said meeting.
"(2) Dr. Leonard S. Rodberg may not be questioned about his own
actions on June 29, 1971, after having been engaged as a member
of Senator Gravel'~ personal staff to the extent that they were clone
at the Senator's direction either at a meeting of the Subcommittee
on Public Buildings and Grounds or in preparation for and intimately related to sa id meeting."
9 The Court of Appeals thought third parties could be questioned
as to their own conduct regarding the Pentagon Papers, "including their dealings with intervenors or his aides." United States v.
Doe. 455 F. 2d 753, 761 (CAl Hl72). Thr court found no mNit
in the claim that such parties should be shielded from questioning
under the Speech or Debate Clause concerning their own wrongful
acts, even if such questioning may bring the Senator's conduct into .
question. Id., at 758, n. 2.
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protect third parties from similar inquiries before the
grand jury. As modified by the Court of Appeals, the
protective order to be observed by prosecution and grand
.JUry was:
"(1) No witness before the grand jury currently
investigating the release of the Pentagon Papers
may be questioned about Senator Mike Gravel's
conduct at a meeting of the Subcommit.tee on Public Buildings a.nd Grounds on June 29, 1971, nor,
if the questions are directed to the motives or purposes behind the Senator's conduct at that meeting, about any communications with him or with
his aides regarding the activities of the Senator
or his aides during the period of their employment,
in preparation for and related to said meeting.
"(2) Dr. Leonard S. Rodberg may not be questioned about his own actions in the broadest sense,
including observations and communications, oral or
written, by or to him, or coming to his attention
while being interviewed for, or after having been
engaged as a member of Senator Gravel's personal
staff to the extent that they were in the course
of his employ_n~nt."
~

.--

The United States petitioned for certiorari challenging the ruling that aides and other persons may not
be questioned with respect to legislative acts and that
an aide to a Member of Congress has a common-law
privilege not to testify before a grand jury with respect
to private republication of materials introduced into
a subcommittee record. Senator Gravel also petitioned
for certiorari seeking reversal of the Court of Appeals
insofar as it held private republication unprotected by
the Speech or Debate Clause and asserting that the protective order of the Court of Appeals too narrowly
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protected against inquiries that a grand jury could direct
to third parties. We granted both petitions. 405 U. S.
916 (1972).
I
Because the claim is that a Member's aide shares
the Member's constitutional privilege, we consider first
is
whether and to "·hat extent Senator Gra l
exempt from process or mquiry y a grand jurYii1'Vestigating the commission of a crime. Our frame of reference is Art. I, § 6, cl. 1, of the Constitution:
"The Senators and Representatives shall receive
a Compensation for their Services. to be ascertained
by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United
States. They shall in all Cases. except Treason,
Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from
Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of
their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned
in any other Place."
The last sentence of the clause provides Members of
Congress with two distinct privileges. Except in cases
of "Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace," the clause
shields Members from arrest while attending or traveling
to and from a session of their House. History reveals,
and prior cases so hold, that this 11art of the clause
exempts Members from arrest in civil cases only.
"When the Constitution was adopted, arrests in civil
suits were common in America. It is only to such arrests that the provision applies." Long v. Ansell, 293
U. S. 76, 83 (1934) (footnote omitted). "Since . . .
the terms treason, felony and breach of the peace, as
used in the constitutional provision relied upon, excepts from the operation of privilege all criminal offenses,
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the conclusion results that the claim of privilege of
exemption from arrest and sentence was without
merit . . . . " Will-iamson v. United States, 207 U. S.
425, 446 (1908). 10 Nor does freedom from arrest confer immunity on a Member from service of process as
a defendant in civil matters, Long v. Ansell, supra, at
82-83, or as a witness in a criminal case. "The Constitution gives to every man, charged with an offense,.
the benefit of compulsory process, to secure the attendance of his witnesses. I do not know of any privilege
to exempt members of Congress from the service, or
the obligations, of a subpoena, in such cases." United
States v. Cooper, 4 Dall. 340, 341 (1800) (11er Chase, J.,
sitting on Circuit). It is, therefore, sufficiently plain
that the constitutional freedom from arrest does not exem t Members of Conaress from the o eration of the
ordmary crumna aws, even t1ough impnsonment may
prevent or interfere with the performance of their duties
as Members. Williamson v. United States, supra; cf.
Burton v. United States, 202 U. S. 344 (1906). Indeed, implicit in the narrow scope of the privilege of
freedom from arrest is, as Jefferson noted, the judgment
that le islators ought not to stand above the law they
create
genera y o e oun
y 1t as are
ordinary persons. Jefferson, Manual of Parliamentary
Practice, S. Doc. No. 91-2 437 (1971).
In recognition, no doubt, of the force of this part of
Clause 6, Senator Gravel disavows any assertion of gen10 Williamson, United States Congressman, had been found guilty
of conspiring to c01mnit subornation of perjury in connection with
proceedings for the purchase of public land. He objected to the
court passing sentence upon him and particularly protrsted that any
imprisomnent would deprive him of his constitutional right to "go
to, attend at and return from the ensuing session of Congress."
Williamson v. United States, 207 U. S. 425, 432-433 (1908). The
Court rejected the contention that the Speech or Debate Clause freed
legislators from accountability for criminal conduct.

l
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eral immunity from the criminal law. But he points
out that the last portion of Clause 6 affords Members
of Congress another vital privilege-they may not be J
questioned in any other place for any speech or debate
in either House. The claim is not that while one part
of Clause 6 generally permits prosecutions for treason,
felony and breach of the peace, another part nevertheless broadly forbids them. Rather, his insistence is
that the Speech or Debate Clause at the ver least rotec s mn rom cnmma or c1v1 1a 1 1 y an from 2 ues-·
t ioni'i'1g elsewhe'retiian in the Sen:ie, ":,ith respect to
t~ents occurrin at the subcommittee hear·ng at
apers were introduced into the
public record.
this claim is incontrovertible.
The Speech or Debate Clause was es1gne o assure a
coequal branch of the government wide freedom of
speech, debate and deliberation without intimidation or
threats from the Executive Branch. It thus protects
Members against prosecutions that directly impinge
upon or threaten the legislative process. We have no
doubt that Senator {}ravel m&v not be made to_;:tn- \
swer-either in terms of questions or m terms ofde:
reiW.ing himself from prosecution-f~r the eve1;,ts th#tt
occurred at the subcommi tee meetmg. Our decisJOn
is ma e easier oy t e act t at the United States appears to have abandoned whatever position it took to·
the contrary in the lower courts.
Even so, the United States strongly urges that because the Speech or Debate Clause confers a privilege
only upon "Senators and Representatives," Rodberg
himself has no valid claim to constitutional immunity
from grand jury inquiry. In our view, both courts
below correctly rejected this position. We agree with
the Court of Appeals that for the purpose of construing
the privilege a Member and his aide are to be "treated
as one," United States v. Doe, 455 F. 2d 753, 761 (CAl

-

I
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1972); or, as the District Court put it: The "Speech or
Debate Clause prohibits inquiry into things done by
Dr. Rodberg as the Senator's agent or assistant which
would have been legislative acts, and therefore privileged, if performed by the Senator personally." United
States v. Doe, 332 F. Supp. 930, 937- 938 (Mass. 1971).
Both courts recognized what the Senate of the United
States urgently presses here: that it is literally impossible, in view of the complexities of the modern legislative process, with Congress almost constantly in session and matters of legislative concern constantly proliferating, for Members of Congress to perform their·
legislative tasks without the help of aides and assistants;
that the day-to-day work of such aides is so critical to
the Members' performance that they must be treated
as the latters' alter ego; and that if they are not so
recognized, the central role of the Speech or Debate
Clause-to prevent intimidation of legislators by tlw
executive and accountability before a possibly hostile
judiciary, United States Y. Johnson, 383 U. S. 169, 181\\'ill inevitably be diminished and frustrated.
The Court has already embraced similar views in BarT
Y. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959) , " ·here in immunizing theActing Director of the Office of Rent Stabilization from
liability for an alleged libel contained in a press release,
the Court held that the executive privilege recognized in
prior cases could not be restricted to those of cabinet
rank. As stated by Mr. Justice Harlan , "the privilege
is not a badge or emolument of exalted office, but an
expression of a policy designed to aid in the effective
functioning of Government. The complexities and magnitude of governmental activity have become so great
that there must be a delegation and redelegation, and
we cannot say that these functions become less important simply because they are exercised by officers of
lower rank in the executive hierarchy." I d., at 572- 573.
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It is true that the clause itself mentions only "Senators and Representatives," but prior cases have plainly
not taken a literalistic apr>roach in applying the privilege. The clause also speaks only of "Speech or D<'bate," but the Court's consistent approach has bern that
to confine the protection of the Speech or Debate Clause
to words spoken in debate would be an unacceptably
narrow view. Committee reports, resolutions, and the
act of voting arc equally covered; "[i] n short, ...
things generally done in a session of the House by one
of its members in relation to the business before it."
Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168, 204 (1880). quoted
with approval in United States v. Johnson, 383 U. S.
169, 179 (1966). Rather than giving the clause a cramped
construction, the Court has sought to implement its
fundamental purpose of freeing the legislator from executive and judicial oversight that realistically threaten
to control his conduct as a legislator. We have little
doubt that \Ve are neither exceeding our judicial powers
nor mista.kenly construing the Constitution by holding '
that the Speech or Debate Clause applies not only to a
Member but also to his aide';'"insofar ; s the conduct of
the latter would be a.~protected lc isla ·
act if performe
y 1e em er nnse .
Nor can " ·e agree with the Ullitcd States that our
conclusion is foreclosed by Kilbourn v. Thompson, supra,
Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U. S. 82 ( 1967), and Powell Y. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486 (1969), where the
speech or debate privilege was held unavailable to certain House and committee employees. Those casrs do
not hold that persons other than Members of Congress
arc beyond the protection of the clause when they perform or aiel in the performance of legislative acts. In
Kilbourn, the Speech or Debate Clause protected House
Members who had adopted a resolution authorizing
Kilbourn's arrest; that act was clearly legislative in na-

-
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ture. But the resolution was subject to judicial review
insofar as its execution impinged on a citizen's rights as
it did there. That the House could with impunity order
an unconstitutional arrest afforded no protection for
those who made the arrest. The Court quoted with approval from Stockdale v. Hansard, 9 Ad. & E. 1, 112 K. B.
1112 (1839): "So if the Speaker by authority of the
House order an illegal act, though that authority shall
exempt him from question, his order shall no more
justify the person who executed it than King Charles'
warrant for levying ship-money could justify his revenue officer." 103 U. S., at 102. 11 The Speech or Debate
Clause could not be construed to immunize an illegal
arrest even though directed by an immune legislative
act. The Court was careful to point out that the
Members themselves were not implicated in the actual
arrest, id., at 200, and, significantly enough, reserved the
question whether there might be circumstances in which
"there may ... be things done, in the one House or
the other, of an extraordinary character, for >vhich the
members who take part in the act may be held legally
responsible." 103 U. S., at 204 (emphasis added).
Dombrowski v. Eastland, supra, is little different in
principle. The Speech or Debate Clause there protected
In Kilbourn, 103 U. S., at 198, the Court noted a second example, used by Mr. Justice Colrridgr in Stockdale, 9 Ad. & E., at
225-226, 112 K. B., at 1196-1197: "'Let me suppose, by way of
illu -tration, an extrrme case; the House of Cmmnons resolves that
any one wearing a drc~s of a particular manufacture is guilty of a
breach of privilege, and orders the arrest of such persons by the
constable of the pari~h. An arrest i ~ made and action brought, to
which the order of the Housr is pleaded as a justification. . . . In
such a rase as the one supposed, the plaintiff's counsel would insist
on the distinction between power and privilege; and no lawyer can
seriously doubt that it exists: but the argument confounds them, and
forbids us to enquire, in any particuhr case, whether it ranges
under the one or the other. I can find no principle which sanctions this.'"
11
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a Senator, who was also a subcommittee chairman, but
not the subcommittee counsel. The record contained no
evidence of the Senator's involvement in any activity that
could result in liability, 387 U. S., at 84, whereas the
committee counsel was charged with conspiring with
state officials to carry out an illegal seizure of records
which the committee sought for its own proceedings.
Ibid. The committee counsel was deemed protected to
some extent by legislative privilege, but it did not shield
him from answering as yet unproved charges of conspiring to violate the constitutional rights of private parties.
Unlawful conduct of this kind the Speech or Debate
Clause simply did not immunize.
Powell v. McCormick reasserted judicial power to determine the validity of legislative actions impinging on
individual rights-there the illegal exclusion of a representative-elect-and to afford relief against House aides
seeking to implement the invalid resolutions. The Members themselves were dismissed from the case because
shielded by the Speech or Debate Clause both from liability for their illegal legislative act and from having to
defend themselves with respect to it. As in Kilbourn,
the Court did not reach the question "whether under the
Speech or Debate Clause petitioners would be entitled to
maintain this action solely against the members of Congress where no agent participated in the challenged action
and no other remedy was available." 395 U. S., at 506
n. 26.

fleet a deci e y Jaundiced view towards extending the
clause so as to privilege illegal or unconstitutional con-
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duct beyond that essential to foreclose executive control
of legislative speech or debate and associated matters such
as voting and committee reports and proceedings. In
Kilbourn, the Sergeant-at-Arms "'·as executing a legislative order, the issuance of which fell within the Speech or
Debate Clause; in Eastland, the committee counsel was
gathering information for a hearing; and in Powell, the
Clerk and Doorkeeper were merely carrying out directions
that were protected by the Speech or Debate Clause. In
each case, protecting the rights of others may have to
some extent frustrated a planned or completed legislative
act; but relief could be aft'orded without proof of a legislative act or the motives or purposes underlying such an
act. No threat to legislative independence was posed,
and Speech or Debate Clause protection did not attach.
None of this, as we see it, involves distinguishing between a Senator and his personal aides with respect to
legislative immunity. In Kilbourn-type situations, both
aide and Member should be immune with respect to committee and House action leading to the illegal resolution.
So too in Eastland, as in this case, senatorial aides should
enjoy immunity for helping a Member conduct committee
hearings. On the other hand, no prior ase has h
th~ Members of_ Cono-ress would
e immune if th¥Y
execute an mva!idresoThtwn by themselves carrl ing out
an iltegal arrest, or 1t, m•order to secure information for
a h;ah ng, iEem,..sO!ves seize the property or invade t~e
privacy of a citizen. Neither ihey nor their aides should
beimmun e h oJ\1 liability or questioning in such circumstances. Such acts arc no more essential to legislating·
than the conduct held unprotected in United States v.
Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966).'~
12
Senator Gravel is willing to assume that if he personally had
"stolen" the Pentagon Papers , and that act wrre a nimc, he could
be prosecuted, as could aides or other assistant" who participated
in the theft. Consolidated Brief of Senator Gravel 93.

•
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The United States fears the abuses that history reveals have occurred when legislators are invested with
the power to relieve others from the operation of otherwise valid civil and criminal la,vs. But these abuses, it
seems to us, are for the most part obviated if the privilege
applicable to the aide is vicwf'd, as it must be, as the
privilege of the Senator, and invocable only by the Senator or by tho aide on the Senator's behalf,"' and if in all
events the privilege available to tho aide is confined to
those serviGes that "·ould be immune legislative conduct
if performed by the Senator himself. This view places
beyond tho Speech or Debate Clause a variety of services
characteristically performed by aides for Members of
Congress, even though within tho scope of their employment. It likewise provides no protection for criminal
conduct threatening the security of the person or property
of others. whether performed at the direction of the
Senator in preparation for or in execution of a legislative
act or done \Yithout_._hi 1-nowledge or direction.
01 er
does it immunize Senator or aide from testi ymg at trials
or grand jury proceedings involving third-party crimes
where the questions do not require testimony about or
impugn a legislative act. Thus our refusal to distinguish
between Senator and aide in applying the Speech or Debate Clause does not mean that Rodberg is for all purposes exempt from grand jury questioning.

We are convinced also that the Court of Appeals correctly determined that Senator Gravel's alleged arrangement with Beacon Press to publish ·the Pentagon Papers
was not protected speech or debate within the meaning
of Art. I, § 6, cl. 1, of the Constitution.
13
It follows that an aide's claim of pri,·ilcge can be repudiated and
thus waived by the Senator.
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Historically the English legislative privilege was not
viewed as protecting republication of an otherwise immune libel on the floor of the House. Stockdale v. Hansard, 9 Ad. & E. 1, 114, 112 K. B. 1112, 1156 (1839),
recognized that "for speeches made in Parliament by a
member to the prejudice of any other person, or hazardous
to public peace, that member enjoys complete impunity."
But it was clearly stated that "if the calumnious or
inflamatory speeches should be reported and published,
the law will attach responsibility on the publisher." 14
14 Stockdale extenRively reviewed the precedents and their interplay with the privilege so forcefully recognized in the Bill of Rights
of 1689: "That the freedom of speech, and debates or proceedings
in Parliament, ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court
or place out of Parliament." 1 W. & M., Sess. 2, c. 2. From thesc
cases, including Re.x v. Creevy, 1 M. & S. 273, 105 Eng. Rep. 104
(1813); Rex v. Wright, 8 T. R. 292, 101 K. B. 1396 (1799); Rex v.
Abingdon, 1 ESP. 225, N. P. Cas. 337 (1795); Rex v. Williams, 2
Show. K. B. 471, 89 Eng. Rep. 1048, it is apparent that to the
extent English precedent is relevent to the Speech or Dcbn,le Clause
there is little, if any, support for Senator Gravel's position with
respect to republication. Parliament reacted to Stockdale v. Hansard
by adopting the Parliamentary Papers Act of 1840, 3 and4 Viet., c. 9,
which stayed proceedings in all cases where it could be shown .t hat
publication was by order of a House of Parliament and was a bona
fide report, printed and circulated without malice. See generally
C. Wittke, The History of English Parliamentary Privilege (1921).
Gravel urges that Stockdale v. Hansard was later rcpndi11ted in
Wason v. Walt er, 4 Q. B. 73 (1868), which held a proprietor immune from civil libel for an accurate republication of a debate in
the House of Lords. But the immunity established in Wason was
not founded in parliamentary privilege, id., at 84, but upon analogy
to the privilege for reporting judicial proceedings. I d., at 87-90.
The Wason court stated its "unhesitating and unqualified adhesion"
to the "masterly judgments" rendered in Stockdale and rhnracterized
the question before it as whether republication, quite apart from
any assertion of parliamentary privilege, was "in itself privileged
and lawful." Id., at 86-87. That the privileges for nonmalicious
republication of parliamentary and judicial proceedings-later established as qualificcl-\vere construed as coextensive in all respects, id.,
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This was accepted in Kilbourn v. Thompson as a "sound
statement of the legal effect of the Bill of Rights and of
the parliamentary law of England" and as a reasonable·
basis for inferring "that the framers of the Constitution
meant the same thing by the use of language borrowed
from that source." 103 U. S., at 202.
Prior cases have read the Speech or Debate Clause"broadly to effectuate its purposes," United States v.
Johnson, 383 U. S., at 180, and have included within its
reach anything "generally done in a session of the House·
by one of its members in relation to the business before
it." Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S., at 204; United
States v. Johnson, 383 U. S., at 179. Thus, voting by
Members and committee reports are protected; and we·
recognize today-as the Court has recognized before,
Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S., at 204; Tenney v..
Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377-378 (1951)-that a Member's conduct at legislative committee hearings, although
subject to judicial review in various circumstances, as is
legislation itself, may not be made the basis for a civil
or criminal judgment against a Member because that
conduct is within the "sphere of legitimate legislative
activity." !d., at 376. 1 5
at 95, further underscores the inappositeness of reading Wason as
based upon parliamentary privilege, which like the Speech or Debate·
Clause is absolute. Much later Holdsworth was to comment that
at the time of Was on the distinction between absolute and qualified
privilege had not been worked out and that the "part played by
malice in the tort and crime of defamation" probably helped retard
recognition of a qualified privilege. 8 Holdsworth's History of
English Common Law 377 (1926).
15 The Court in Tenney, 341 U. S., at 376-377, was equally clear
that "legislative activity" is not all-encompassing, nor may its limits
be established by the Legislative Branch: "Legislatures may not of
course acquire power by an unwarranted el\1:ension of privilege. The
House of Common's claim of power to establish the limits of its
privilege has been liLtle more than a pretense since Ashby v. White, .
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But the clause has not been extended beyond the legislative sphere. That Senators generally perform certain
acts in their official capacity as Senators does not necessarily make all such acts legislative in nature. Members
of Congress are constantly in touch with the Executive
Branch of the Government and ·with administrative
agencies-they may cajole, and exhort with respect to the
administration of a federal statute-but such conduct,
though generally done, is not protected legislative activity.
United States v. Johnson decided at least this much.
"No argument is made, nor do we think that it could be
successfully contended, that the Speech or Debate Clause
reaches conduct, such as was involved in the attempt to
influence the Department of Justice, that is in no wise
related to the clue functioning of the legislative process."
383 U. S., at 172. Cf. Burton v. United States, 202 U. S.
444, 367-368 (1906).
Legislative acts are not all-encompassing. The heart
of the clause is speech or debate in either House, and insofar a the clause is construed to reach other matters,
they must be an integral part of the deliberative and
communicative processes by which Members participate
in committee and House proceedings with respect to the
consideration and passage or rejection of proposed legislation or with respect to other matters which the Constitution 11laces within the jurisdiction of either House. As
the Court of Appeals put it, the courts have extended
the privilege to matters beyond pure speech or debate
in either House, but "only when necessary to prevent indirect impairment of such deliberations." United States
v. Doe, 455 F. 2d 753. 760 (CAl 1972).
2 Ld. Raym. 938. 3 id., 20. This Court haH not he.,;itated to sustain the rights of pri,·ate indi,·idual~ when it found Congre.,~ mtH
acting outside its lrgi>'lati,·c role. Kilbourn v. Thom]Json, 103 U. S.
158; Marshall v. Gordon, 24:3 U. S. 521; compnre McGrain v.
Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 17G."
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Here private publication by Senator Gravel through
the cooperation of Beacon Press was in no way essential to the deliberations of the House; nor does questioning as to private publication threaten the integrity
or independence of the House by imper111issibly exposing its deliberations to executive influence. The Senator
had conducted his hearings, the record and any report
that was forthcoming were available both to his committee and the House. Insofar as we are advised, neither
Congress nor the full committee ordered or authorized
the publication.' a We cannot but conclude that the
Senator's arrangements with Beacon Press were not part
and parcel of the legislative process.
There are additional considerations. Article I, § 6,
cl. 1, as we have emphasized, does not purport to confer
a general exemption upon ]\{embers of Congress from
liability or process in criminRl cases. Quite the contrary is true. While the Speech or Debate Clause recognizes speech, voting and other legislative acts as
exempt from liability that might otherwise attach, it
docs not privilege either Senator or aide to violate an
otherwise valid criminal law in preparing for or im11lementing legislative acts. If republication of these classified papers was a crime under an Act of Congress, it
was not entitled to immunity under the Speech or Debate Clause. It also appears that the grand jury was
, n The sole constit-utional claim a~;; erf ed hr rr i ~ ba8 rd on t he
Speech or DPbnto Clausr. vVe need no t adclrr""' i ;;s n r~ which ma y
n r i~e when Congress or eit her H ou ~ r , m; cli~ tingui slwcl from a ~ iugl e
?l'frmber , order~ th e publication nnd j or publi c di ~ tribution of r ommi ttre h ea ring~ . report s or other mat r ri .1ls. Of couJ-.~e, Art. I , § 5,
C l. 3. r equires thn t each House " k eep n .Journ:t! of it ~ Pror e eding~,
nn e! from t ime t o time pnbli~ h t he same, r xl' <:pting such Pr1rts as
ma:v in t heir Judgm en t r equire Secrecy .. .. " This Clausr h a ~ no t
lJC'Pil t he ,;ubjPrl of extPnsive judieial examin niion. Sec Field v.
Clark, 14:1 U. S. 6-19 , 670- 071 (1 892) ; United St ates v. Ballin, 144

U.S. 1, 4 (1892) .

l
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11ursuing this very subject in the normal course of a
valid investigation. The Speech or Debate Clause does
not in our view extend immunity to Rodberg, as a Senator's aide, from testifying before the grand jury about
the arrangement between Senator Gravel and Beacon
Press or about his own participation, if any, in the
alleged transactioll, so long as legislative acts of the
Senator are not impugned.

III
Similar considerations lead us to disagree with the
Court of Appeals insofar as it fashioned, tentatively at
least, a nonconst!,tutional testimonial privilw e protecting Rodberg from any quesb omng by the grand jury
concerning the matter of republication of the Pentagon
Papers. This privilege, thought to be similar to that
protecting executive officials from liability for libel, cf.
Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 564 (1959), was considered
advisable "to the extent a congressman has responsibility to inform his constituents." But \Ve cannot carry
a judicially fashioned privilege so far as to immunize
criminal conduct proscribed by an Act of Congress or
to frustrate the grand jury's inquiry into whether publication of these classified documents violated a federal criminal statute. The so-called executive privilege
has never been applied to shield executive office-rs
from prosecution for crime, the Court of Appeals " ·as
quite sure that third parties were neither immune
from liability nor from testifying about the republication matter and we perceive no basis for conferring a
testimonial privilege on Rodberg as the Court of Appeals
seemed to do.

!

IV
We must finally consider, in the light of the foregoing, whether the protective order entered by the Court
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of Appeals is an appropriate regulation of the pending·
grand jury proceedings.
Focusing first on paragraph two of the order, we think
the injunction against interrogating Rodberg with respect
to any act, "in the broadest sense," performed by him
within the scope of his employment, overly restricts
the scope of grand jury inquiry. Rodberg's immunity,
testimonial or otherwise, extends only to legislative acts,
as to 'X.ltich the Senator himself would be immune. The
grand jury, therefore, if rele\'ant-t'6 1 s mvest1gation
into the possible violations of the criminal law and
absent Fifth Amendment objections, may require from
Rodberg answers to questions relating to his or the·
Senator's arrangements, if any, with respect to republication or with respect to third party conduct under )
valid investigation by the grand jury, as long as the·
questions do not implicate legislative action of the Senator. Neither ow erceive a1'1Y cnn~t·itutiofiaiOr other
pr~ le "li< t~§hiel fL,RoQbrg, any more t 1an any o 1er
witness, from r nd jury questions relevant to tracing
the source o o
.
•
e enator § ~~x~ swn anc are t c asic
subj ~t ma'tfer of t 1quiry in t h't; case, as long as no
legislative act is im icat d by the uestions.
ecause t 1e Speech or Debate
ause pnvilege applies both to Senator and aide, it appears to us that
paragraph one of the order, alone, would afford ample
protection for the privilege if it forbade questioning any
witness, including Rodberg: (1) concerning the Senator's conduct, or the conduct, of his aides, at the June 29,
1971, meeting of the subcommittee; 1 7 (2) concerning

1

17
Ihving established that neither the Sennt or nor Tiodberg i ~
subject to liability for what occurred at the subcommittee hearing,
we perceive no basis for inquiry of either Rodberg or third parties
on this subject. If it proves material to establish for the record the ·
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the motives and purposes behind the Senator's conduct,
or that of his aides, at that meeting; (3) concerning
communications between the Senator and his aides during the term of their employment and related to said
meeting or any other legislative act of the Senat:~
'*("4) except as 1t proves re:levantto investigating possible
third party crime, concerning any act, in itself not criminal, performed by the Senator, or by his aides in the
course of their cmplo ment ·
rati n
comm·
arin
e leave the final form of such
an order to the Court of Appeals in the first instance, or,
if that court prefers, to the District Court.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated
and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.

1
r'

fact of publication
the subcommittee he:trin~. whirh seems undisputed, the public r cord of the hearing would appear sufficirnt
for this purpose. We
not intend to imply, howrver, that in no
grand jury im·cstig:ttions or criminal trials of third parties may
third-party witne ses be int rogated about legislatiYe acts of Me
hers of Con~res;;;. As for it nuiry of Rodbrrg about thi
pnrly
JS~i~5'~ ·. '~l he Di~1rirt Court has
~ c grand jury prorerdings within proper bmmdR :mel to
forrclose improvident h:ua~~ment and fi~hing expeditions into the
nffair~ of a Member of Congre~s th:t t are no proper concern of thcgt·and jury . ~l.

o:TheC~
T OF 'lli E UNITED STATES

•

)

Circulated:

)

tat~ S~nator

4J::_J

~ \ ' \ v\ Y
\

Recirculated:

)

i1.

Douglas
Stewart
WhitA
Marshall
Blaokmun
Powell
Rehnquist

From: Brennan, J.

)
)

)
)
)
)

Mr. Justice
Mr. Justice
Mr . Justice
Mr . Justice
Mr . Justice
Mr . Justice
Mr . Justice

1

------

On Writs of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.

)
)
)

1972]

MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting.

.

,,.,.o
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The facts of this case, which are detailed by the Court, and the

objections to over-classification of documents by the Executive, detailed
by my Brother Douglas, need not be repeated here. My concern is with
the narrow scope accorded the Speech and Debate Clause by Today's
decision. I fully agree with the Court that a Congressman 9 s immunity
under the Clause must be extended to his aides if it is to be at all effective.
The complexities and press of Congressional business make it impossible
for a member to function without the close cooperation of his legislative
assistants. Their role as his agents in the performance of official duties
requires that they share his immunity for those acts. The scope of that
immunity, however, is as important as the per sons to whom it extends.
In my view today's decision so restricts the privilEge of Speech or Debate
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as to endanger the continued performane of legislative tasks that are vital
to the workings of our democratic system.
I.

In holding that Senator Gravel's alleged arrangement with Beacon
Press to publish the Pentagon Papers is not shielded from extra-Senatorial
inquiry by the Speech or Debate Clause, the Court adopts what for me is a
far too narrow view of the legislative function.

The Court seems to assume

that words spoken in debate or written in congressional reports are protected
by the Clause, so that if Senator Gravel had recited part of the Pentagon
Papers on the Senate floor or copied them into a Senate report, those acts
could nd: be questioned "in any other place." Yet because he sought a wider
audience, to publicize information deemed relevant to matters pending before
his own committee, the Senator suddenly loses his immunity and is exposed
to grand jury investigation and possible prosecution for the publication. The
explanation for this anomolous results is the Court's belief that "Speech or
Debate" encompasses only acts necessary to the internal deliberations of
Congress concerning proposed legislation. "Here," according to the Court,
"private publication by Senator Gravel through the cooperation of Beacon Press
was in no way essential to the deliberations of the Housep" Ante at 18.
Therefore, "the Senatorv's arrangements with Beacon Press were not part
and parcel of the legislative process." Ibid.
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Thus the Court excludes from the sphere of protected legislative
activity a function that I had supposed lay at the heart of our democratic
system. I speak, of course, of the legislator's duty to inform the public
about matters affecting the administration of government. That this
"informing function" falls into the class of things "generally done in a
session of the House by one of its members in relation to the business
before it," Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204 (1880) was explicitly
acknowledged by the Court in Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).

e

In speaking of the '1power of Congress to inqui:Jlinto and publicize corruption,
maladministration or inefficiency in the agencies of Government, " the Court
noted that "From the earliest times in its history, Congress has assiduously
performed an vinforming function' of this nature. " Id., at 200, n. 33.
We need look no further than Congress itself to find evidence supporting the Court 9 s observation in Watkins. Congress has provided:fi.nancial
support for communications between its members and the public, including
the franking privilege for letters, telephone and telegraph allowances,
stationery allotments, and favorable prices on reprints from the Congressional
Record. Congressional hearings, moreover, are not confined to gathering
information for- internal distribution, but are often widely publicized, sometimes televised, as a means of alerting the electorate to matters of public
import and concern. The list is virtually endless, but a small sampling of
contemporaneous hearings cf this kind would certainly include the Kefauver
hearings on organized crime, the 1966 hearings on automobile safety, and

.
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the numerous hearings of the Senate Foregin Relations Committee on the
origins and conduct of the War in Vietnam. In short, there can be little
doubt that informing the electorate is a thing "generally done" by the
members of Congress "in relation to the business before it."
The informing function has been cited by numerous students of
American politics, both within and without the Government, as among the
most important responsibilities of legislative office. Woodrow Wilson,
for example, emphasized its role in preserving the separation of powers
by ensuring that the administration of public policy by the Executive is
understood by the legislature and electorate:
"It is the proper duty of a representative body to look
diligently into every affair of government and to talk much
about what it sees. It is meant to be the eyes and voice,
and to embody the wisdom and will of its constituents.
Unless Congress have and use every means of acquainting
itself with the acts and the disposition of the administrative
agents of the government, the country must be helpless to
learn how it is being served; and unless Congress both
scrutinize these things and sift them by every form of discussion, the country must remain in embarrassing, crippling
ignorance of the very affairs which it is most important that
it should understand and direct." W. Wilson, Congressional
Government 303 (1885).
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Others have vieded the give-and-take of such communication as an important
means of educating both the legislator and his constituents:
"With the decline of Congress as an original source of legislatio:p.,
this function of keeping the government in touch with public opinion
and of keeping the public opinion in touch with the conduct of government becomes increasingly important. Congress no longer governs
the country; the Administration in all its ramifications actually
governs.

But Congress serves as a forum through which public

opinion can be expressed, general policy discussed, and the conduct
of governmental affairs exposed and criticized." The Reorganization
of Congress, A Report of the Committee on Congress of the APSA
13-14 (1945}.
Though I fully share these and related views on the educational values served
by the informing function, there is yet another and perhaps more fundamental
interest at stake. It requires no citation of authority to state that public
concern over current issues -- the war, race relations, governmental invasions of privacy -- has transformed itself in recent years into what many
believe is a crisis of confidence, in our system of government and its capacity
to meet the needs and reflect the wants of the American people. Communication
between Congress and the electorate tends to alleviate that doubt by exposing
and clarifying the workings of the political system, the policies underlying new
laws and the role of the Executive in their administration.

To the extent that
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the informing function succeeds in fostering public faith in the responsiveness of Government, it is not only an "ordinary" task of the legislator but
one that is essential to the continued vitality of our democratic institutions.
Unlike the Court, therefore, I think that the activities of Congressmen
in communicating with the public are legislative acts protected by the Speech
or Debate Clause. I agree with the Court that not every task performed by
a legislator is privileged; intervention before Executive departments is one
that is not. But the informing function carries a far more persuasive claim
to the protections of the Clause. It has been recognized by this Court as
something "generally done" by Congressmen, the Congress itself has
established special concessions designed to lower the cost of such communication, and, most important, the function furthers several well-recognized
goals of representative government. To say in the face of these facts that
the informing function is not privileged merely because it is not necessary
to the internal deliberations of Congress is to give the Speech or Debate
Clause an artificial and narrow reading unsupported by reason.
Nor can it be. supported by history.

There is substantial evidence

that the Framers intended the Speech or Debate Clause to cover all communications from a Congressman to his constituents. Thomas Jefferson clearly
expressed that view of legislative privilege in a case involving Samuel Cabell,
Congressman from Virginia. In 1797 a federal grand jury in Virginia investigated the conduct of several Congressmen, including CalDell, in sending

- 7newsletters to constituents critical of the administration's policy in the
war v.i th Franceo The Grand Jury found that the Congressmen had endeavored "at a time of real public danger, to disseminate unfounded
calumnies against the happy government of the United States, and thereby
to separate the people therefrom; and to increase or produce a foreign
influence, ruinous to the peace, happiness, and independence of these
United States." Jefferson immediately drafted a long essay signed by
himself and several citizens of Cabell's district, condemning the grand
jury investigation as a blatant violation of the congressional privilegeo
Revised and joined by James Madison, the protest was forwarded to the
Virginia House of Delegates. It reads in part as follows:
" o • o that in order to give to the will of the people the
influence it ought to have, and the information which may
enable them to exercise it usefully, it was a part of the
common law, adopted as the law of this land, that their
representatives, in the discharge of their functions, should
be free from the cognizance or coercion of the coordinate
branches, Judiciary and Executive; and that their communications with their constituents should be of right, as of duty
also, be free, full, and unawed by any: that so necessary has
this intercourse been deemed in the country from which they
derive their descent and laws, that the correspondence between
the representative and constituent is privileged there to pass
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free of expense through the channel of the public post, and that
the proceedings of the legislature have been known to be arrested
and suspended at times until the Representatives could go home
to their several counties and confer with their constituents . . • . •
"That when circumstances required that the ancient confederation
of this with the sister States, for the government of their common
concerns, should be improved into a more regular and effective
form of general government, the same representative principle
was preserved in the new legislature, one branch of which was to
be chosen by the citizens of each State, and the laws and principles
remained unaltered which privileged the representative functions,
whether to be exercised in the State or General Government, against
the cognizance and notice of the coordinate branches, Executive and
Judiciary; and for its safe and convenient exercise, the intercommunication of the representative and constituent has been
sanctioned and provided for through the channel of the public post,
at the public expense.

"

0

0

0

"That the grand jury is a part of the Judiciary, not permanent
indeed, but in office, pro hac vice and responsible as other judges
are for their actings and doings while in office: that for the Judiciary
to interpose in the legislative department between the constituent and
his representative, to control them in the exercise of their functions
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or duties towards each other, to overawe the free correspondence
which exists and ought to exist between them, to dictate what
communications may pass between them, and to punish all others,
to put the representative into jeopardy of criminal prosecution, of
vexation, expense, and punishment before the Judiciary, if his
communications, public or private, do not exactly square with
their ideas of fact or right, or with their designs of wrong, is to
put the legislative department under the feet of the Judiciary, is to
leave us, indeed, the shadow, but to take away the substance of
representation, which requires essentially t hat the representative
be as free as his constituents would be, that the same interchange
of sentiment be lawful between him and them as would be lawful
among themselves were they in the personal transaction of their
own business; is to do away the influence of the people over the
proceedings of their representatives by excluding from their
knowledge, by the terror punishment, all but such information or
misinformation as may suit their own views; and is the more vitally
dangerous when it is considered that grand jurors are selected by
officers nominated and holding their places at the v.i ll of the
Executive o o o; and finally, is to give to the Judiciary, and through
them the Executive, a complete preponderance over the legislature
rendering ineffectual that wise and cautious distribution of powers
made by the constitution bet\\een the three branches, and subordinating

- 10to the other two that branch which most depends on the people
themselves, and is responsible to them at short periods."
8 The Works of Thomas Jefferson 322-327 (Ford ed. 1904).
Jefferson's protest is perhaps the most significant and certainly the most
cogent analysis of the privileged nature of communication between Congressman and public. Its comments on the history, purpose and scope of the
Clause leave no room for the notion that the Executive or Judiciary can in
any way question the contents of that dialogue. Nor was Jefferson alone
among the Framers in that view. Aside from Madison, who joined in the
protest, James Wilson took the position that a member of Congress "should
enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and ••• should be protected from everyone,
however powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion offense. "
I Works of James Wilson 421 (McCloskey ed. 1967). Wilson, a member of the
Committee responsible for drafting the Speech or Debate Clause, stated in
plainest terms his belief in the duty of Congressmen to inform the people
about proceedings in the Congress:
"That the conduct and proceedings of representatives should be
as open as possible to the inspection of those whom they represent,
seems to be, in republican government, a maxim, of whose truth or
importance the smallest doubt cannot be entertained. That, by a
necessary consequence, every measure, which wil facilitate or secure
this open communication of the exercise of delegated power, should be
adopted and patronized by the Constitution and

law~

of every free state,

- 11 seems to be another maxim, which is the unavoidable result of
the former." Id. , at 422.
Wilson's statements, like those of Jefferson and Madison, reflect a deep
conviction of the Framers, that self-government can succeed only when
the people are informed by their representatives, without interfernce
by the Executive or Judiciary, concerning the conduct of their agents in
government. That conviction is no less valid today than it was at the time
of our founding. I would honor the clear intent of the Framers and extend
to the informing function the protections embodied in the Speech or Debate
Clause.
This conclusion is not inconsistent with the English view of legislative
privilege, which the Court reads as supporting its interpretation of the Clause,
Ante, at 16.

On the contrary, the Speech or Debate Clause of the English

Bill of Rights was at least in part the product of a struggle between
Parliament and Crown over the very type of activity involved in this case.
During the reign of Charles II, the House of Commons received a number of
reports about an alleged plot between the Crown and the King of France to
restore Catholicism as the established religion of England. The most famous
of these reports, Dangerfield's Narrative, was entered into the Commons
Journal and then republished by order of the Speaker of the House, Sir
William Williams, with the consent of Commons.

In 1686, after James II

came to the throne, informations charging libel were filed against Williams
in King's Bench. Despite the arguments of his attorney," Sir Robert Atkyns,
that the publication-'was necessary to the "counselling" and "enquiring"

- 12 functions of Parlliment, Williams' plea of privilege was rejected and he
was finedj'10, 000. Shortly after Williams' conviction James II was sent
into exile, and a committee was appointed by the House of Commons to
report upon 11 such things as are absolutely necessary to be considered
for the better securing our Religion, Laws, and Liberties." In reporting
to the House, the chairman of the committee stated that the provision for
freedom of speech and debate was included "for the sake of one, . • • Sir
William Williams, who was punished out of Parliament for what he had
done in Parliament. n 9 Grey's Debates 81.

Following consultation with

the House of Lords, that provision was included as part of the English Bill
of Rights, and the judgment against Williams was declared by Commons
"illegal and subversive of the Freedom of parliament." I Townsend,
Memoirs of the House of Commons (2d ed. 1844).
Although the origins of the Speech or Debate Clause in England can
be traced to a case involving republication, the Court, citing Stockdale v.
Hansard, 9 Ad. & E. 1, 112 K. B. 1112 (1839), says that "English legislative privilege was not viewed as protecting republication of an otherwise
immune libel on the floor of the House." Ante, at 16. Tha conclusion reflects
an erroneous reading of precedent. Stockdale did state that "if the calumnious
or inflammatory speeches should be reported and published, the law will
attach responsibility on the publisher." But that result was repudiated
thirty years later in Wason v. Walter, 4 Q. B. 73 (1868): There the proprietor
of the London Times was sued for printing an acc<;>unt of a libellous debate in
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the House of Lords. The Court agreed with Stockdale that the House could
not confer immunity on any publication merely by ordering it printed and
then asserting parliamentary privilege. The issue for the Court, therefore,
was whether the publication "is, independently of such order or assertion
of privilege, in itself privileged and lawful." Id., at 87.

On that issue

the Court severely criticized the reasoning of earlier cases, including
Stockdale, stating that two of the Justices in that case had expressed a
"very shortsighted view of the subject." Id., at 91.

The Court held that

so long as the speech itself was privileged, i.e., delivered by a member
"for the information of his constituents, " id., at 95, republication of the
speech could not be the basis of a libel action. Relying not on the Parliamentary
Papers Act of 1840, which was enacted in response to Stockdale, but on the
analogy to judicial reports and the need for an informed public, the Court
stated:
"It seems to us impossible to doubt that it is of paramount public

and national importance that the proceedings of the houses of
parliament shall be communicated to the public, who have the
deepest interest in knowing what passes within their walls, seeing
that on what is there said and done, the welfare of the community
depends. Where would be our confidence in the government of the
country or in the legislature by which our laws are framed, and to
whose charge the great interests of the country are commited, wher_e would be our attachment to the constitution under which we
live, - if the proceedings of the great council of the realm were

- 14shrouded in secresy and concealed from the knowledge of the nation?
How could the communications between the representatives of the
people and their constituents, which are so essential to the working
of the representative system, be usefully carried on, if the constituencies were kept in ignorance of what their representatives
are doing? What would become of the right of petitioning on all
measures pending in parliament, the undoubted right of the subject,
if the people are to be kept in ignorance of what is passing in either

house? Can any man bring himself to doubt that the publicity given
in modern times to what passes in parliament is essential to the
maintenance of the relations subsisting between the government,
the legislature, and the country ar large?" Id., at 89.
The fact that the debate wa&(mblished in violation of a standing order of
Parliament was held to be irrelevant. "Independently of the orders of the
ho'lB es, there is nothing unlawful in publishing reports of parliamentary
proceedings • • . • [A] ny publication of its debates made in contravention
of its orders would be a matter between the house and the publisher. " Id., at
95.

Seventy years later, in his memorandum to the House of Commons'
Select Committee on the Official Secrets Acts, Sir Gilbert Campion, a noted
scholar, reviewed the publication cases through Wason and concluded:
"If •

o

o

a member circulated among his constituents a speech made

by him in Parliament in which he had disclosed information [otherwise
'

subject to the Official Secrets Acts], it might be held on the analogy of
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the principles which have been said to apply to prosecutions for libel
that he could not be proceeded against for disclosing it to his constituents, unless, of course, the speech had been made in secret
session. Even if the suggested analogy is not admitted, it would be
repugnant to common sense to hold that though the original disclosure
in the House was protected by parliamentary privilege, the circulation
of the speech among the member's constituents was not." Minutes of
Evidence Taken Before the Select Committee on the Official Secrets Acts
29 (1939).
In my view, therefore, the English precedent, if relevant at all, supports
Senator Gravel's position in this case.
Thus, from the standpoint of function or history, it is plain that
Senator GravePs dissemination of material, placed by him in the record of a
congressional hearing, is itself legislative activity protected by the privilege
of Speech or Debate. Whether or not that privilege protects the publisher from
prosecution or the Senator from Senatorial discipline, it certainly shields the
Senator from any extra-congressional inquiry about his part in the publication.
As we held in United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (196,6), neither a Congressman, nor his aides, nor third parties may be made to test~y concerning

- 16privileged acts or their motives. That immunity, which protects legislators
"from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their legislative duty, "
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377 (1951), is the essence of the Clause,
designed not for the legislators' ''private indulgence but for the public good."
Id., at 377.
That privilege, moreover, may not be defeated merely because a
court finds that the publication was irregular or the material irrelevant to
legislative business.

Legislative immunity secures "to every member

exemption from prosecution for everything said or done by him as a representative in the exercise of the functions of that office, . • . whether the
exercise was regular, according to the rules of the House, or irregular and
against their rules." Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1, 27 (1808).

Thus, if the

republication of this committee record was unauthorized or even prohibited
by the Senate rules, it is up to the Senate, not the Executive or Ju:iiciary, to
fashion the appropriate sanction to discipline Senator Gravel.
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Similarly, the Government cannot strip Senator Gravel of the
immunity by asserting that his conduct "did not relate to any Congressional
business. " Brief, at 41. The Senator has stated that his hearing on the
Pentagon Papers had a direct bearing on the work of his Subcommittee on
Buildings and Grounds, because of the effect of the Vietnam War on the
domestic economy and the lack of sufficient federal funds to provide adequate
public facilities. If in fact the Senator is wrong in this conteit ion, and his
conduct at the hearing exceeded the subcommittee's jurisdiction, then again
it is the Senate that must call him to task.

This Court has permitted con-

gressional witnesses to defend their refusal to answer questions on the
ground of non-germaneness. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1954).
Here, however, it is the Executive that seeks the aid of the judiciary, not to
protect individual rights, but to extend its power of inquiry and interrogation
into the privileged domain of the legislature. In my view the Court should
refuse to turn the freedom of Speech or Debate on the Government's notions
of legislative propriety and relevance. We would weaken the very structure
of our constitutional system by becoming a partner in this assault on the
separation of powers.
Whether the Speech or Debate Clause extends to the informing function
is an issue whose importance goes beyond the fate of a single Senator or Congressman. What is at stake is the right of an elected representative to inform,
and the public to be informed, about matters relating directly to the workings
of our Government. The dialogue between Congress and people has been
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recognized, from the days of our founding, as one of the necessary elements
of a representative system. We should not retreat from that view merely
because, in the course of that dialogue, information may be revealed that
is embarrassing to the other branches of government or violates their notions
of necessary secrecy.

A member of Congress who exceeds the bounds of

propriety in performing this official task may be called to answer by the
other members of his chamber. We do violence to the fundamental concepts
of privilege, however, when we subject that same conduct to judicial and
executive scrutiny. The threat of "prosecution by an unfriendly executive and
conviction by a hostile judiciary," United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S., at 179,
which the Clause was designed to avoid, can only lead to timidity in the performance of this vital function. The Nation as a whole benefits from the
Congressional investigation and exposure of official corruption and deceit.
It likewise suffers when that exposure is replaced by muted criticism, carefully

hushed behind Congressional walls.
11.

Equally troubling in today's decision is the Court's refusal to bar
grand jury inquiry into the source of documents received by the Senator and
~

-

placed by him in the . hearing record. The receipt of materials for use in a
congressional hearing is an integral part of the preparation for that legislative
act. In United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S., 169 (1966), · the Court acknowledged
the privileged nature. of such preparatory steps, holding that they, like the act
itself and its motives', must be shielded from scrutiny by the Executive and

~
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~('~
~

Judiciary.

That holding merely recogniz

~

~

;_~

~

~

the obvious -- that speeches,

hearings, and the casting of votes requ· e study and planning in adva
It would accomplish little toward the oal of legislative freedom to exempt an
official act from intimidating scrutin , if other conduct leading up to the act
and intimately related to it could be eterred by a similar threat. The
reasoning that guided the Court in J hnson is no less persuasive today, and
I see no basis, nor does the Court ffer any, for departing from it here. I
would hold that Senator Gravel's eceipt of the Pentagon Papers, including
the name of the per son from

om he received it, may not be the subject of

inquiry by the grand jury.

~~--------------I would go further,

however, and also exlude from grand jury inquiry

any knowledge that the Senator or his aides might have concerning how the
"'source himself first came to possess tl;le Papers. This immunity, it seems
to me, is essential to the performance of the informing function.

Corrupt

and deceitful officers of government do net often post for public examira tion

a__ t I
f.j;...,...

the evidence of their own misdeeds. That evidence must be ferreted out, and
often is, by fellow employees and subordinates. Their willingness

t~l

--from their contact in Congress that their identity and means of obtaining-the

that information and spark.Con,aessional inquiry may well depend on assurances

\.........

~

..........

,_,

--~----------------------------------------

evidence wi. ll be held in strictest confidence. To permit the grand jury to
frustrate that expectation through an inquiry of the Congressman and his aides
can only dampen the flow of inforim tion to the Congress and thus to the American

- 20people. .There is a similar risk, of course, when the member's own House
requires him to break the confidence. But the danger,it seems to me, is
far less if the members' colleagues, and not an "unfriendly executive" or
"hostile judiciary," are charged with evaluating the propriety of his conduct.
In any event, assuming that a Congressman can be required to reveal the
sources of his information and the methods used to obtain that information,
that power of inquiry, as required by the Clause, is that of the Congressman's
House, and of that House only.
I respectfully dissent.

4/17/72
MEMO TO JUSTICE POWELL

ReNo. 71-1017, 71-1026, Gravel v.

u.s.

Because the issues in this case seem particularly difficult
to focus on, owing primarily, I suspect, to the unique nature
of this litigation, I will attempt to summarize the arguments
of the parties before suggesting any analysis of the case.
The summaries will necessarily be
not going to attempt to
this memo.

d~

( Hah 1)

shor~,

in part because I am

all the historical material in

I have not yet the amicus briefs
J\..

8R~~~RKYEkX$xKR~MMRNX$

with the

exception of the Senate's brief.

xxxxx~exxxNxxSxxxexxEERRRRxxxxex

has ruled that

~.
I

-

As the case now stands, CA 1

Senator Gravel's immunity under the Speech

or Debate clause extends to written reports of committee
proceedings.

The immunity prohibits the executive and judicial

branches from inquiring into the acquisition of information
introduced into a judicial proceeding because such inquires
might dry up a Senator's sources and chill his willingness
to search out information.

The privilege was not found to

extend to republication of the subcommitte record which was
the proper subject of a grand jury inquiry.

CA 1 found that

the dependency of Senator's on their aids was so strong that
it was essential that the Senator be able to exercise his
privilege to prevent any aid from testifying about any matter
on which the Senator himself could assert his privilege before
a grand jury.

Even persons who were not Senatorial aids could

not be questioned about legislative motivation
~NmRXX£XNXKXK11U~NXXMXM~NXXXMHXtKX~N~Xl§M«~~W

~gx~~~~XKM8

since the executive
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had no authority to inquire into that motivation, but the
govt could inquire into the conduct of third parties including
their relationships with Sen Gravel so long as motivation was
not the subject of the inquiry.

7

In a somewhat confusing

section of the opinion, the court ruled that republication
might be protected from govt inquiry by a more general form

7

of legislative immunity, not founded in the Speech or Debate
Clause, analagous to executive immunity.

The result of this

opinion is to forbid the grand jury from calling Sen Gravel
to testify concerning any aspect of his connection with the
Pentagon Papers--something which the govt was evidently not
going to do in any case.

-

Aids to Sen Gravel may testify about

events before their employment or about events not related to
the papers, but they may not testify about events after their
employment which relate to Sen Gravel's use of the Penatagon
Papers.

This would include republication which)although exempt

from the Speech or Debate immunity, was covered by the more

7

general legislative immunity.

Third pa#s, in this case

officals of publishing houses, were permitted to testify about
any aspect of the Pentagon papers and their negotiations with
Sen Gravel with the exceptiontion of his motivation.

As I

analyze the opinion of CA 1, it takes a functional approach.
It says that the Speech or Debate clause applies only to
legislative activites done in the House, and hence not to
republication.

It then extends the immunity to third persons

and aids to the extent it thinks necessary to protect the
underlying value of the Clause, viz , the protection of legis-

'

-3-

lative activity from judicial and executive interference.
I l

Finally, it recognizes a
___....

,,

xxgNEXE

more vague area of protection,

-----

.J

outside the scope of the Speech or Debate clause, covered
by legislative immunity--a doctrine, which like

~

ex~~

1

or judicial immunity, stems from the seperation of powers

-

-...._::

directly without textual support in the Constitution.
SENATOR GRAVEL' ARGUMENTS
I. REPUBLICATION:

The Senator begins with the statement

from Kilbourn v. Thompson that the Speech or Debate clause
protects all things "generally done in a session of the House
by one of its members in relation to business before it."
Kilbo~-

was the first Speech or Debate case decided by this

Court, and its statement of the scope of the clause has been
accepted in the

cases that followed. From an historical analysis

of the privilege in England, he argues that its

scop~as always

been determined by the actual functions performed by the
legislature.

When those functions changed, the privilege

changed along

with~it.

Ultimately, in England, the circulation

by members of the legislature of their speeches and other
proceedings became privileged.
the framers had in mind the

In addition to this history,

N~X~XNXXXNE

)

seperation of powers

doctrine, not a part of the English law, , which must vary
with the times so that it can be effective.
Today, it is argued, one practice commonly engaged in by
members of Congress and essential to the goals of a representative
government is the informing funcition of communicating with the
public.

In a representative democracy, the public must be

-4-

informed of the important issues of the day.

Consequently,

almost every Congressman in some way or another, often by
newsletter, republishes materials and speeches that he has
entered in the Record.

While there may be a different case

when this republication is used to interfere with the rights
of an individual by slandering him or in some other way,
when there is no such situation, the only issue becomes the
seperation of powers.

If the executive can institute grand

jury proceedings and interrogate witnesses about a Senator's
exercise of his informing function, it may interfere with a
legislator's communication with his constituents.

For this

reason, the Framers intended that the Speech or Debate clause
bar the executive and the judiciary from interfering with
this legislative function.
opposition to a

grar~

The Senator cites Jefferson's

jury investigation of a newsletter

sent by Congressmen Cabell which was critical of foreign policy.
Other quotes in favor of open communications are cited.

Art I,

Sec. 5 requiring the publication of a record of Congressional
proceedings establishes xkxx the duty of legislators to communicate.
Finally, the Mathew Lyon case is cited.
The Senator also relies on English history.

The legislative

free speech clause of the English Bill of Rights grew

di~ectly

from a prosecution of a member for publishing a committee
report.

While the tradition in England of the right of newspapers

to make public debates in the legislature differs from our own,
owing to the original fear that such publications would lead to
prosecutions by a hostile Crown, the law in that area also

-5evolved to the point where such a right exists.

This too was

an acknowledgement of the legislatures duty to inform and the
people's right to know.
F inally, insofar as the opinion of CA 1 hints that the
proceeding s which led to the publication in the subcommittee
records were irre gular, that fact is irrelevant.

Courts can

not supervize leg islatures to the extent of disapproving of
procedures a leg ilslature chooses to adopt in carrying out its
function.

If an individual legislator acts in an irregular

way, only the legislature has authority to so determine and
to act.
THE SG'S ARGUMENTS
I. REPUBLICATION:

The SG

agrees with CA 1 that Speech

or Debate immunity applies only to things done "in either
House."

Whilh informing members and publishing committee

reports is essential to the functioning within the House,
the private republication of committee reports is not.

In

United States v. Johnson, the Court ruled that intercession
with the executive branch, something commonly done by Congressmen,
was none-the-less not protected by the Speech or Debate clause.
There is no support for extending the privilege to
.A._

republication from English history.
sought privacy.

The legilslature

or~g inally

Members were criminally punished on the basis

of republication of their leg islative speeches.
1868, after the Constitution was written,

XNN

Only since

was the privilege

extended to republication, and then the extention was effectuated
in part by statute.

While American authorities are sparse,
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there is a district court case, McGovern v. Martz, which says

1

that republication is not protected, and some others which seem
to lean the same way.

CA 1 spoke also of a general lee;islative privilege,analgous \
to executive or judicial privilege.

But such privilege

extends only to immunity from tort liability and not to
testifying before a grand jury.

The idea behind the immunity

is that discretionary decisions should not be the basis of
liability.

This does not require immunity from grand jury

testimony.

Thus, while the SG

-

re~cgnizes

such a privilege,

he does not think it applies in this case.

It certainly does

not apply, however, to third perrsons who are not legislative
aids and who have no le g islative function.
xxxxxxxxxSRRRgMx®Rx'9RR1t'XRxxMMMNxXXx®"RxHRSx1t~x~MxR'9xR1tR'XxRSx

SENATOR GRAVEL'S REPLY BRIEF
&n'f ;sh

In his reply brief, Sen Gravel points out that the case
II

which established the liability of a member of the leg islature
for republished statements was soon repudiated, in part by a
revolution against the King .

More recent cases had repudiated

the doctrine of the case insofar as it applied to this issue
before any statute was enacted.
On the matter of leg islative privilege, Sen Gravel points
out that the President claims that the privilege extends not
to just immunity from tort liability but to immunity from
testimony before a Congressional committee.

The argument

-7advanced for this proposition, turns on the President's need
to communicate with his aids in secret.

Why does the legislative

branch not have the same need and privilege?
THE SG" AR GUMENT
II . SPEECH OR DEBATE IMMUNITY OF AIDS AND THIRD PARTIES:
On its face, the Speech or De bate Clause extends only to XRXXOC
~axxms:

"the Senators and Representatives."

Even though the

number of aids and the dependency on them was probably not
estimatea in 1787, it was certainly realized at the time
that Congress would have some employees, and legal action
directed at these employees must have been forseeable.
"~ile

English history on the immunity of aids under the speech

privilege is hazy, there is history on the privelge against
arrest which is also found in Art I, Sec 6.

That history

shows that because of abuse, the privilege of servants and
families of legislators not to be arrested was withdrawn.
When this history is read in light of the clear language of
the Constitution and contempraneous statements, it shows that
only legislators were protected.

\

In two suits brought against members of Congress and
their employees to correct erroneous Congressional action,
the Court has dismissed the suit against the Congressmen on
Speech or Debate grounds , and has sustained the jurisdiction
against the employees.

In Kilbourn v. ThomQQon , the plaintiff

sued Congressmen and a sergeant-at-arms for taking him to custody
on a contempt citation.

In Powell v. McCormack , the plaintiff

sued members of the House plus the doorkeeper -for denying him
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seat.

In both cases, employees of the leg istature were

r---------

held responsible for their particiapation in unconstitutional
activity.
,

Although Dombrowski v. Eas:tla!ld contains evidence

that suggests that s ome privile ge extends also to le g islative
aids, the privle ge miscussed in that case was the general
le g islative

priv~ge.

Of course, if the speech or debate

privilege ca nnot be asserted on the behalf of aids, it cannot
be asserted on the behalf of other persons.
This interpretation is consistent with sound policy.
The main function of the Speech or Debate clause is to immunize

~~

leg islators from harassment by civil or criminal suit.
could
The only thing that RENNN result from questioning aids is
to make it more

/""\.

diff~ic~

to hire them, but that is a far cry

from subjecting members to liability.

Any embarassment from

quest.iwning an aid is too minor when compared with society's
interest in prosectuing crimes.

Aids, unlike Congressmen,

are not subject to majority control or to Congressional discipline.
The sweeping privile ge asserted by Sen. Gravel could be used
to protect those not closely related to the functioning of
the leg islatu re by putting them on the staff.
SENATOR GRAVEL 'S ARGUHENTS
II. SPEECH OR DEBATE I HHUNITY OF AIDS AND THI RD PARTIES:
Sen. Gravel argues that the SG has mis-interpreted his position.
He does not claim that his aids should be bathed with immunity
for their acts or that they have any privilege at all.

He

asserts that he has an immunity from having the executive or
judiciary question his le g islative acts, and that he can
assert this immunity to prevent the govt from inquiring into
his leg islative acts by compelling testimony from his aidso
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Morep{er, he claims that CA 1 erred by not ruling that any
inquiry as to third parties concerning his leg islative aets,
as opposed to merely thel~otivation for those acts, was also
subject to the Senator's privilege,

In Johnson, the Court would

not permit inquiry of third parties as to how, as opposed to
why a speech was prepared.

If such inquiry can be made, it

will be difficult to distinguish when motivation and when something else is the subject of the inquiry.

Motivation will be

readily inferred in some instances.
Inquiry of leg islative acts by subpoenaing third parties
has the same potential for intimidation and harassment as does
i:R subpoenaing a le g isltor.

If a Sen~ cannot depend on his

aids,he will be inhibited in carrying out his duties. In some
En glish cases, persons who had a relationship with a leg islator,
were not allowed to g ive cestimony because of infringment of
the leg islator's privile ge.
In .QQmbrQ.Nski v. Eastland,
XmMNNX~XWKs:xxes:s:

appl icable.

Johnson was to the same effect.
the Court .said that

KRxem~XI&}CVf:R~rs:

a Senator's immunity was less absolute, but

Powell v. McCormack

was different because the

employee was ministerial and because he was carryin g out an
unconstitutional act of the House.

It was the legality of the

act which was examined, not the motivation of legislators
or an,'5i' deliberation.

Similarly in Kilbourne v. Thompson,

the holding was that a ministerial employee could be enjoined
from carrying out an unconstitutional act, not that he could
be questioned about leg islative acts.
RiRKXX~¥

the seperation of powers problem is made more

-1 a-

serious when aids on whom a legisltor depends and printer$,
without whom he would be unable to communicate with his constituents are the subject of the inquiry.

It is quite permissible

to ask these persons anything that does not concern the
leg islative process, but to require them to answer questions
about the leg islative process will destroy their relationship
with x le g islators.

xfxxRe

Finally, Sen. Gravel would balance the social interests
different from the SG.

He says that the govt has no compelling

need to call these people.

If there is

le~islative

misconduct,

the le g islature itself is the proper person to grant relief.
If there were a victim of E±rix leg islative abuse, then the
courts might have jurisdiction.

It is rare that any wrongdoing

will go unpunished because of this interpretation of the
privilege, but if it does, that is a price we pay for separation
of powers.

Finally, the privilege could be asserted only by

the member, so only if he a greed could misconduct of others
be covered up.
In specific response to the SG, Sen. Gravel makes several
points.

The privilege a gainst Ex±m±Hx arrest is historically

distinct and seperate

E

from the

sp~ech

privilege.

The location

of the two privileges in the same section is caused by stylistic
econmmy not by historical design.

So is the fact that the

Speech or Debate privilege is writen in terms that limit it
to members of Congeess rather than by subject matter.
resulted from a stylistic change at the convention.

That
Nor is

the SG correct that the privilege is primarily to avoid civil
suits; the privile ge is primiarily motivated by separation of
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powers.

-

THE SENATE' ARGUMENT
T he Senate supports the position of Sen. Gravel.

one argument to his.

It adds

It argues the Court ought to accept its

g_osition on the extent of the Speech or Debate privilege as a
matter of comity due bo a co-equal branch.

If the Senate

-------

says that it needs the privilege to be interpreted that broadly
the Court ought to do so.
The SG replys that it is the Court's duty, not the Senate's,
to interpret the Constitution.
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DISCUSSION
In Brewster the appraoch we took toward the Speech or

-

-

Debate clause was that it protected only leg islative acts,
i.e., things generally said or done in either House.
is both a narrow and a broad interpretation.

That

Narrow in that

it does not cover all the activities of leg islators-- Brewster's
alleged a greement to vote a certain way in return for a

bri~e;

Johnson's attempt to influence the Justice Department.

Broad

in that it rec gonizes that sppech or debate is to be given
more than its literal meaning.

Thus, it would seem clear to

me that any leg islative activity done in the legislature is
protected by the speech or debate clause.

In this case, Sen.

Gravel's introdoution of the Penuagon papers into his subcommittee
(I think it

hear in
cases that in

is ~ implcit

in the past

_le g islature does not just mean on the floor

of the House, but also includes offical acts taken in committee.
The clause itself talks about acts done"in the House" not on
the floor.)
I would also think that Sen. Gravel's acquisition of
the papers would be covered, although I am not quite so sure

~here. To take a
~\~v~~ breaking into an
7

,

ludicrous case, if he had been apprehended
office to get information to use in a committee

11114 ~.... ?,
JYl
~
hearing , one would hesitate to call that a legislative act.

~

On the other hand,if the executive has the power to ask a
Senator where and how he got the infromation he introduced into
the record, it is surely inquiring into a legislative act.
I suppose that the decision in Johnson is determinative on
) this point.

In Johnson the Court ruled not only that the Speech
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or Debate clause prohibited the govt from basing a prosecution
on a speech made on the floor of the House, but also that
the govt could not inquire as to how the speech was written.
If the govt cannot base a prosecution on something that is
introduced into the record of a subcommittee, it would seem,
by close analagy, that it could not inquire as to where the
infromation came from.

(!)

I a gree with the government, however, that republication
is not protected by the Speech or Debate clause. I do not
focusing
mean that the govt can by XNKMKHK on the act of republication,
inquire back . into leg islative acts, but that as long as it
I

asks about the

~ctual

republication, it is on safe ground.

(Incidentally, I have ·never quite understood what possible
relevance to anything Sen Gravel ' s offering of these papers
to publishing houses, by itself, with no reference to their
acquisition, coul d have.)
in the house.

Republication is not an act done

While I a gree that it is essential to modern

\..

communications between representative and constituent, I don't
think it fits under the interpretation of the clause put forth
in Brewster.

Gravel argues that the scope of the privilege

must expand with the times, as indeed it must, but only with

,.

respect to leg islative acts"' as they have been defined.
. .
. '1 ,'
. d 11
f Ln
repu b.
lLcatLon
to b e sLmL
ar to

I

·~Ln~ercession with the
-

"' which the Court found not to be protected in John2Qg.
executive,
(I pass for the moment the question of whether republication
is protected, and to what extent, by a general le g islative
privilege.)
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As I see it, the leg islator can invoke a privilege to
prevent the executive and the judiciary from inquiring into
v
\I.
It
any leg islative act--an act occurring in the course of the

II.

I

,I.

leg is l ative process.

It does not seem to me that this privilege

should be so limited that the executive is prohibited from
inquiring into a le g islative act only if it does so in a direct

manner by attempting to question a leg islator.

The Speech or

Debate clause provides:
"and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they
[Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned
in any other Place."
The SG makes a great deal of the fact that only Senators and
Representatives have the privilege, but Sen, Gravel does not
argue differently.

He does not request that aids and third

persons should also have the privilege.

Instead he argues

that the privile ge means that the executive may not
speech or debate.

questio~

·~~~

\~

Once it is determine that the subject

vY'

matter of the questioning is speech or debate, it does not-- _'QA
""~matter how the questioning is carried out; the leg islator ~w~
has a privilege and can stop it.

Thus, if the executive

have knowled ge of it or even by questioning third persons
about it, the leg islator has a privilege to stop that questioning .
The SG's arguments to the contrary do not seem convincing .
As I said, they are premised on the theory that Sen. Gravel

p~ile g e ~this

But the

case was not invoked by the aid or

by~the

publishers; it was invoked by Sen. Gravel when he intervened.

--=~-----...-/

1

~~S

seeks to question speech or debate by questioning aids who

wants the privlege to be extended to his aids.

r

\, __
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And that is all he seeks.

The claim that it must have been

known that the Congress would have employees is

MXX

only because it is another argument based on this

weak not
faulty

premise, but also because there is no reason to think that
this type of employee was anticipated; we have nothing bpt
the SG's assertion. History is confused, and I see no conclusion
to be drawn from the arrest privilege.
of Kilbourne v. Thompson

The two precedents

and Powell v. McCormack are the

SG's strongest points, but even they are in conflict with
langague in Dombrowski v. Eastland.

More importantly, in both

of those case there was no attempt to inquire into speech or
debate; they attempt was to enjoin an illegal act taken not
by a single legislator

E~xmrx

but by an entire House.

Just

as there would be no Speech or Debate reason that would prevent
the enjoining of an official who is seeking to carry out an
illegal or unconstitutional Act of Congress; so should there
be no reason to prevent the enjoining of an employee of a
House from carrying out an illegal or unconstitutional act
of that single House.

In both

Kilbo~

and Powell the result

of legislative acts--in effect, one-House legislation--was
enjoined.

Legislative activity--activity in passing and

deliberating on legislation--was not enjoined or subjected
to inquiry.
I would therefore say that when activity falls under
the Speech or Debate definition, a legislator has a privilege
to prevent the govt from inquiring into it regardless of how
the govt attempts to do so.

Thus,
______., neither Sen. Gravel's aids
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nor third parties could be asked about the Senator's legislative

activities~ To that .extent, I would differ from CA 1 which

-

said that the grand jury could not inquire into only certain
kinds of legislative activity by asking third persons--it
said only legislative motivation was

ke~

protected.

There remains the problem of legislative privilege.
Executive privilege does not stem from any provision of the
Constitution; it
of powers.

/\

ari~ses,

inherently, out of the separation

There is also xN a judicial privilege; judges are

immune from §1983 litigationx alleging that they are ruling
in such a way as to violate civil rights.

(That is) ofE course

in state court, but there is also a federal precedent.)
No one denies that there is alfi'some kind of legislative

privilege to be asserted by a legislator over his or his
aids

E~

being subpoened to testify.

The SG says xN::xx that

the privilege is limited to liability in tort suits, but
as the ITT hearings are showing, executive privilege is not
asserted to be so narrow.

I don't know exactly what to say

about legislative privqlege, but I think that if the President
could prevent an aid from testifying about executive activity
before a grand jury, a legislator ahould be able to do the
same.

Neithe7 of

cours~

could prevent

testi~ony

that had nothing to do with legislative activity.

about matters
Therefore,

(

I think that minimally, legislative privilege could b..:_ prop::_sly
~ed

to preve.:::_his aids

ac~ivit~ore

EXXXN

~stifying

about legisla:fve

the grand jury even if the Speech or Djbate

clause does not extend that far.

-17What about republication?

That may not be legislative

activity covered by the speech or« debate clause, but it is
none.:.the-less X!R"gi:s:xa:xi:xe activity properly carried on by
legislators within our Constitutional scheme.

Like CA 1,

I do not know whether leg islative privlege could be invoked
to prevent inquiry into such activity.

I know of no xxa

anal g ies to executive privlege, and I have not researched
this particular problem at all.

I guess the way to approach

the question is to ask whether repubication is the kind of
legislative activity:K which the Constitution would want to
keep entirely separate from executive and judicial intervention •
But to

•

r'

su~ gg est

an

1\ /

apprp~ch

would stay open on this

:Jli~N

is not to suggest an answer.

I

point until there is some time to

research or at least think about it some
Fox

mo~.
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Abstract of Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880)
This is the first major case involving the Speech and Debate
clause. It involved a suit for damages brought by Kilbourn against
the Sgt. at Arms of the House and several members of a House Committee which had adjudged him to be in contempt and ordered his
imprisonment for 45 days.
In holding that the Speech and Debate clause protected members

of Congress, Justice Miller (pp. 201 et seq. of the opinion) reviewed
the history of the clause, cited and quoted from the leading English
case of stockdale v. Hansard (p. 202), and from the leading Massachusetts
case of Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1, and then reached the following
conclusion:
"It seems to us that the views expressed in the

authorities we have cited are soundmd are applicable
to this case. It would be a narrow view of the
constitutional provision to limit it to words spoken
in debate. The reason of the rule is as forcible in
its application to written reports presented in that
body by its committees, to resolutions offered, which,
though in writing, must be reproduced in speech, and
to the act of voting, whether it is done verbally or by
passing between the tellers. In short, tcthi ngs generally
done in a session of the House by one of its members
in relation to the business before it.

2.
"It is not necessary to decide here that there may

not be things done, in the one House or the other, of an
extraordinary character, for which the mbmers who
take part in the act may be held legally responsible.
(p. 204)
It is to be noted that Justice Miller did not go beyond action in

the House . However, Chief Justice Parsons of Massachusetts in
Coffin v. Coffin, did use some dictum that goes quite far.

He stated

that his opinion was not confined to what the member did in "his place
in the House;' saying that he was "satisfied that there are cases in
which (a member) is entitled to this privilege when no within the walls
of the representative's chamber." (203-204).
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No. 71-1017 and 71-1026 GRAVEL v. U.S.
Abstract - U.S. v. Johnson, 383
u. s. 169 ( 1965).
This leading case, opinion by Harlan, involved the criminal prosecution
o f Johnson (a former Congressman), Frank Boykin (another Congressman)
and three others - charged with conspiracy to exert influence on the Department
of Justice to obtain dismissal of indictments against savings and loan officers
for mail fraud.
Johnson made a speech in the House, which the evidence indicated
was prepared for him by others, and for which he was paid by the savings
and loan co-conspirators.
At the trial, Johnson himself, and others, were examined about the
speech, how it was written, his personal knowledge of factual material in
the speech, and his motivation.
or
History of Speech Xllll Debate Clause
Harlan reviews briefly, and interestingly, the history of the Clause,
showing that there was no discussion of it in the constitutional convention;
that it was taken from the Articles of

~Confederation,

which in

turn came almost verbatim from the English Bill of Rights of 1689.

2.
Justice Harlan noted that few cases had dealt with the Clause. He
refers to Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (see p. 179 of Harlan's
opinion), and to Penny v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367 (see p.

17~

of Harlan

opinion).
Purpose of the Clause and Its Extent
In holding that Johnson was protected by the Clause from the questions
asked him, the Court said:
"Even though no English or American case casts bright light
on the one before us, it is apparent from the history of the
clause that the privilege was not born primarily of a desire
to avoid private suits such as those in Kilbourn and Penny,
but rather to prevent intimidation by the executive and
accountability before a possibly hostile judiciary. "
(180)
The opinion also stated:
"The privilege has been recognized as an important
protection of the independence and integrity of the legislature. '' ( 178)
But in discussing the scope of the privilege, there is a good deal of
language in the opinion which indicates that it relates only to "due functioning
of the legislative process", and is concerned primarily - if not exclusively with what transpires in "a session of the House".

The Court:

"No argument is made, nor do we think that it could be
successfully contended, that the speech or debate clause
reaches conduct . . . that is in no wise related to the due
functioning of the legislative process. " (p. 172).

3.
At another point, the Court said - in discussing Kilbourn:
"The Court (in Kilbourn) held that the privilege should be
read broadly, to include not only 'words spoken in debate',
but anything 'generally done in a session of the House by
one of its members in relation to the business before it. "
Holding:
In holding that Johnson could not be interrogated - or anyone else
as to Johnson's "motives" - the Court emphasized the motivation point:
The essence of such a charge (of conspiracy) is that the
Congressman's conduct was improperly motivated, and
as will appear that is precisely what the speech or debate
clause generally forecloses from executive and judicial
inquiry. " (p. 180)
At several other points, Justice Harlan emphasized that there could
be no inquiry into motives or intentions.

In quoting from the English case of ex parte Wason, the following

statement by Mr. Justice Lush was quoted:
"I am clearly of opinion that we ought not to allow it to
be doubted for a moment that the motives or intentions
of members of either house cannot be inquired into by
criminal proceedings with respect to anything that they
may do or say in the House." (p. 183).
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No . 1026
U. S. v . Gravel
Justice Brennan ' s memo , attached , adequately states the
background of this case and the ruling of
HcEntee , Coffin).

CA 1 **x«~x(Aldridgei

Bo:th the govt and Senator Gravel MRN have

applied for cert in this case .

The govt does not contest

that Sen Gravel's petition should be NRNXRN~ gr~d , but
the Senator does contest the granting of the govt ' s petition .
I think that both should be gratned .
The Senator seeks to challenge the ruling of CA 1 that
republication of the RRNRK Pentagon papers , which he read
into the public record of his committee hearings , is not
challenged by the Speech or Debate Clause .

He claims that

informing the public of legislative acts and of matters of

-.... .
-2concern to Congress is a legislative act and that the Clause
prevents

x~N

the govt from R inquiring into legislative acts.

The Senator also challenges the ruling that the grand jury may
inquire of persons with whom the S~nator dealt, aside from his
staff, so long as it does not inquire into legislative motivation.
They argue essentially that this is an unworkable limitation
which will chill the

x~

freedom of the legislator.

The govt challenges the holding that the grand jury may
not call Senator Gravel's aids and that it may not inquire
into legislative motives.
protected by

K~NX

It says that the aids are not

the clause, and that inquiry into legislative

motivation may be relevant for purposes other than the prosecution
of the legislator.

For example, if a legislator has taken a

bribe, it may be necessary to inquire into his motives, not to
prosecute him, but to prosecute the briber.

In reply, the

Senator points out that RG the govt has in the past recognized
that a legislator cannot operate without aids and that his
ability to function will be greatly impaired if the govt may
inquire of his aids about legislative acts.

l:N He says that

all courts have ruled that the Speech or Debate Clause applies
to aids, and that the govt has consistently argued this position
itself.
Although I tend to agree with the Senator that some immunity
should be extended to aids, there is a question as to how much.
This Court has

R~~xx

never ruled on the problema

The

pre~ise
I

perameters of the Speech or Debate Clause have never been precisel
defined because there have so few

x~

cases.

This case, along

with Brewster which is being reargued, give the Court a chance
to thoroughly consider those perameters.
K GRANT

Fox

I
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No. 71-1017
Gravel v. United States
~

No. 71-1026
United States v. Gravel
As the attached letter shows, another case XHX raising
issues similar to this one is coming up
~a

CA DC .

~kNXM

on cert from

I do not think that is relevant to your disposition

of this cert, except that it probably indicates a split in
the circuits.

If you grant Gravel and theN other case proves \

to be certworthy, it can be set with Gravel at a later date.
/ Fox

71-/or7
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URBAN LAW INSTITUTE OF ANTIOCH COLLEGE
Suite 509, 1145 Nineteenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036

Jean Camper Cahn, Director

202/833-1700

·February 11, 1972
HAND DELIVERED

Hon. E. Robert Seaver, Clerk
Supreme Court of the United States
Washington, D.c.
ATTENTION:
RE:

RC

Mr. Michael McLaughlin
Deputy Clerk
OFFICE:: OF THI: tvLc::..l K
SUPREME COURT, U.S.

poe, et al. v. McMilla~_,~_!: al.,
No. 71-1027 (D.C. Cir., January 20, 1972)

·f ·

.. Dear Mr. Seaver:
Please be advised that the Urban La~;v Institute of Antioch
College, counsel for appellants in the referenced-case, intends
to file in the Supreme Court, no later than Monday, March 13,
\
1972, and earlier if possible, a petition for a writ of certiorari
seeking revic"liv of the January 20, 1972 decision by a divided pm1.el
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Dist-r-i-c-t---of- -Columbia
Circuit.
The petition will present questions as to the existence or
scope of immunity enjoyed by the Chairman and members of a Committee
of Congress, under Article 1, Section 6, of the Constitution, when
sued in a federal court by private citizens alleging a violation
of their right to privacy as a result of the contents of a report
prepared by the staff of the Committee. The petition will also
present questions as to the existence
scope of Article 1,
_Section 6, immunity of Congressional Committee staff members or
-~onsultants who are not close personal aides of the Congressman,
officials and employees of the Government Printing Office, and officials
and employees of the District of Columbia public school system
who dealt 1i•7ith and provided private information to Committee staff
members or consultants. The petition \•7ill also present questions as
to the interplay of Article 1, Section 6, immtmity and the doctrine
of official immunity.

or

.

·~

/

~

.

2

In its opinion of January 20, 1972 in Doe v. McMillan, a
divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit ruled, on grounds of immunity, that
a federal district court h ad no jurisdiction to en tertain the
appellants' right to privacy claims against any of the classes of
persons outlined above--all on the basis of "official immunity,"
and some on the additional basis of Constitutional immunity under
Article 1, Section 6 (The Congressman, Committee Staff and
Committee consultants).
The decision to file a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari,
rather than to return to the Court of Appeals "tvith a Petition for
Rehearing or a Suggestion for Hearing En Bane, is due primarily
to the filing this we ek of cross petitions for "tvrits of certiorari
in Gravel v. Do~ (Nos. 71-1331, 1332 and 1335; First Circuit,
January 7, 1972; rehearing__ deni~d, January 18, 1972). The recent
filing of these petitions, together "tvith the pendency of another
case in the Supreme Court raising questions dealing with Article 1,
Section 6, immunity (United States v. Bre"t·7 Ster, No. 70-45, restored
to the calender for reargument, 40 U.S.L.W. 3351), indicated to us
that a sav~ng of the Supreme Court's time and effort would result
. from concurrent consideration of the questions raised in Doe v.
McMillan w·ith the questions presented in the other cases.
I.

Secondly, on J·anuary 10, 1972, the Supreme Court granted a
petition for a "tvrit of certiorari filed by the District of Columbia
Government in District_ of C_qJ~~bi_~ v. f_arter (No. "71-564) which
·presents que stions as to the scop e of the "official immunity" doctrine
in the District of Columbia. See Carter v. Carlson,
u.s. App.
D.C. ____ , 447 F. 2d 358 (1971). In Carter, a panel of the United
States Court of Appeals for the District --of-Ge-l-". i: .m&i-a--G-ire-ui-t- li-mi-t::-ed--------the doctrine of official immunity, distinguished ~~rr v. Matte~,
360 U.s. 564. (1959), and announced that the test for differentiating
ministerial from discretionary actions by governmental officia~and
employees is a factual one and therefore cannot be determined from
the pleadings alone (as was done in Doe v. McHillan).

--

--- --

-

Accordingly, we believe that the questions \vhich shall be
presented in our petition \oJill provide the Supreme Court with
issues which are central to its announced inquiries il1;tO Article 1,
Section 6, immunity, and official immunity, in the context of the
right of private citizens to protect their privacy.
We have today filed a motion \,7i.th the United States Court of
Appeals requesting a continuation of its . injunction pending
certiorari proceedin gs , provided that a petition for a writ of
certiorari is filed with the Supr eme Court no l a t er than March 13,
1972. I am also enclosing a copy of lo·v1er Cour t's opinion in Doe
•.J

...

.;..

,

3

-

v. McMillan for your consideration.
If you have any questions, please contact myself or
Mr. Michael Valder, an attorney on the staff of the Urban Law
Institute of Antioch College who is actively engaged with me in
representing our clients in this case.

'

·.

Sincerely yours,

' '

~~ . /1>.--.J..M- {l;._,___
~&/~~.,lfi

'

cc:

...

I

.

Jean Camper Cahn
Director,
Urban Law Institute of
Antioch College, and
Atto~~ey for Appellants
Petitioners in Doe v. McMillan

Hon. Irwin N. Gris\vold
Solicitor General of
the United States
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E. ROBERT SEAVER

February 22, 1972

CLERK OF THE COURT

Memorandum to the Chief Justice
From the Clerk
Re:

No. 71-1017-CFX)
71-1026 - CFX)

As requested, I spoke to counsel about the possibility of expediting the filing of briefs in order that these
cases could be heard with United Sta t e s v. Brewster in the
Ap r il session, this Term.
The Solicitor General could meet an expedited schedule but counsel for G:cave l advised me that they could not
comple ~e the extensive r es earch they are conducting and file
a s uit able brief in less than the 45 days allowed by the
Rules. This will take the cases into Octob e r Term 1972.
They said, too, that the issues in Gravel are not as much
like those in Brewster as they are like those i n Doe v.
McM~ : -:.~ 11 (Ct. App., D.C., the opinion in whi ch ca;e-we circulated last week ) ; U.S. Servicemen's Fund v. Eastland (Dist.
Ct., D.C.); MC Sourly v. McClellan (Dist. Ct., D.C.); and
Carter v. Carlson (Ct. App., D.C.), 447 Fed. 2nd 358. The ~
said the latter cases are on their way t o this Court.
Counsel for Gravel saw no problem if their case is
not argued until next Term.
Respectfully,

Copy to the Jus t it ·- S
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No. 71-10 7 and 71-1026 GRAVEL v. U.S.
Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1958)
This case involves the extent of "executive privilege" under common
law.
The Acting Director of Rent stabilization issued a press release
announcing suspension of certain employees, who were criticized therein.
The employees instituted a libel action, and the defense of absolute privilege
was invoked - and sustained in an opinion by Harlan (concurred in only by
Frankfurter, Clark and Whittaker). Black concurred in the result; Warren,
Douglas and Brennan dissented, holding that at most there is only a
"qualified'executive official except at the highest level - such as a cabinet
officer (as in Spaulding v. Vilas, 161 U. S. 483).
If the privilege was absolute, no suit could be maintain.

If merely

"qualified", then liability can be imposed only if the statement is untrue
and malice can be proved.
Justice Harlan noted that "the law of privilege as a defense by officers
of government to civil damage suits for defamation and kindred torts has in
large part been of judicial making." He noted that judges have an absolute
privilege with respect to their judicial functions.

Mter citing Spaulding v.

Vilas (which sustained an absolute privilege on behalf of the Postmaster
General), Har Ian said:

2.
'We do not think that the principle announced in Vilas can
properly be restricted to executive officers of cabinet rank
. . . The privilege is not a badge or emolument of
exalted office, but an expression of a policy designed to
aid in the effective functioning of government. " ( 572)
Dissenting Opinions
Chief Justice Warren, with Douglas joining, strongly dissented on
the ground that executive privilege (with the possible exception of most
senior officers was "qualified" only). He would not "extend Vilas to cover
public statements of lesser officials".
The dissenters emphasized the importance of public criticism and
debate, saying:
"-----'"

"Thus, at best, a public critic of government has a qualified
privilege. " ( 585)
(Note:

If this language is applied to the aids of Senator Gravel, their common

law privilege would be only a qualified one.)
Justice Brennan dissent followed the same line.

stewart dissented

purely on the facts, agreeing generally with the principles stated by Justice
Harlan.

lfp/ss lee
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No. 71-1017 and 71-1026 Gravel v. U.S.
Analysis of Opinion of First Circuit (Judge Bailey Aldrich)
The Factual Setting
A Grand Jury sought to investigate facts relating to the obtaining
and publication of the Pentagon papers by Senator Gravel.
Gravel himself was not summonsed, and the government states that
it has no intention of calling him. But his aide, Dr. Rodberg, and Howard
Webber (director of MIT press) were summonsed.

They moved to limit

the testimony that can be presented to the grand jury, and Gravel intervened
to assert the Speech or Debate Clause (the Clause) which reads in part as
follows:
" . . for any speech or debate in either House (they) Senators
and Representatives shall not be questioned in any other place. "
Decision of District Court (Judge Garrity)
See petition for writ, p. 38, for Judge Garrity's :e:x:KHiBd. excellent
opinion.
The protective order entered by Judge Garrity was modified by
the Court of Appeals to read as follows:
(1) No witness before the grand jury currently investigating
the release of the Pentagon Papers may be questioned about
Senator Mike Gravel's conduct at a meeting of the Subcommittee
on Pulbic Buildings and Grounds on June 29, 1971, nor, if
the questions are directed to the motives or purposes behind

2.
the Senator's conduct at that meeting, about any communications with him or with his aides regarding the activities of the
Senator or his aides during the period of their employment,
in preparation for and related to said meeting.
(2) Dr. Leonard S. Rodberg may not be questioned
about his own actions "in the broadest sense, including
observations and communications, oral or written, by or
to him, or coming to his attention" while being interviewed
for, or after having been engaged as a member of Senator
Gravel's personal staff to the extent that they were in the
course of his employment.
The Opinion of the First Circuit
(a) Area admittedly covered by Clause.

Whatever a senator says

or does on the floor, or before a subcommittee, is within the absolute
privilege.

This also extends to written reports of Committees. As to these

matters - which in the words of the Court's opinion in Johnson are within
the "legislative process" - a Senator need not answer questions anywhere before a grand jury or otherwise.
(b) Source of material and information The circuit court opinion
extends the privilege to the "acquisition of information", holding that a
Senator cannot be asked where he obtained

l§lm

papers or information.

The

opinion draws a distinction between the privilege in this respect, and the
possibility of criminal prosecution - based on other evidence - if the
Senator has violated the law in obtaining the information.
(My

Comm~nt:

I am not sure this is a correct view. We might draw a line,

as in the Brewster case, between questions about a criminal act and

3.
questions as to the use of the fruits of the Act in a speech or otherwise in
the legislative process.
a Senator

For example, if there was reason to believe that

had~

burglarized an office and stolen top secret papers,

I think he could be asked whether he committed this crime. He could not
be asked what he did with the stolen documents, whether he used them in a

speech or otherwise in the legislative process.

Admittedly this is a difficult

line to draw; yet, I am not persuaded that the Clause was intended to prevent
questioning a Senator - before a grand jury or otherwise - about a burglary,
the taking of a bribe or any other specific crime.)
(c) Private publication (republication).

The opinion notes that Gravel

does not claim his freedom to speak is circumscribed by any inquiry into
the subsequent private publication:
"Intervenor (Gravel) acknowledges that it will not affect his
freedom to speak (if the right to public privately is denied),
since the speech has already been made (and can be
repeated in the Senate) but argues that republication is
essential to the 'due functioning of the legislative proces8 '"
(A 25).
In denying Gravel's argument, the Court went on to say:
"The difficulty is that the term 'legislative process' is no
more self-defining than 'Speech or Debate.' The language
and history of the Speech or Debate clause is a surer
guide to the scope of the privilege than catch-phrases, and
we find in both a focus upon matters occurring in the course
of deliberation. This had been the English concept upon which
our privilege had been ~patterned.

*****

4.
"Our courts have expanded the privilege beyond the act
of debating within Congress a proposal before it only when
necessary to prevent indirect impairment of such
deliberations. See Kilbourne v. Thompson, ante; Coffin
v. Coffin, 1808, 4 Tyng (Mass. ). 1.
-'We do not find private republication within that
category. The fact that it may be customarily done by
members of Congress is not the answer. Only those
acts by which a congressman ordinarily expresses to the
House his views on matters before it come within the
Supreme Court's extension of the privilege to 'things
generally done * * * in relation to the st business before
Congress L ' Kilbourne v. Thompson, ante, at 204.
A, 25, 26, 27)
( My Comment:

I cannot accept Gravel's argument that the clause covers

"informing the electorate". If so, any speech made anywhere by a Senator
would be protected; any communication - such as the weekly newsletter would be so protected. It seems clear to me that this type of speech and
conduct is not within either the language or the intent - as derived from its
history of the Clause.)
(d) Common law privilege.

Citing Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 564

(absolute immunity given to a subordinate officer in the executive

d~partment

as to a news release), the Circuit Court - by a tortuous process of HHE
nebulous reasoning (A p. 28) concludes that although there is no privilege
under the speech or debate clause with respect to private publication,
Senator Gravel has a common law privilege and therefore "he may not be
questioned at all as to republication".

5.
(My Comment: This makes no sense to me whatever. If a Senator has a
"absolute privilege" as to all private publications merely by virtue of
being a Senator, we have really opened "a can of worms"!
(e) Legislative aides.

The First Circuit concludes that "the aide

and the legislature ' (are to be) treated as one", and that this "synonymity
is founded upon the relationship, and not upon the fact of employment.

The

court also holds:
"Rodberg, for example, is not protected from inquiry as
to event unconnected, with intervenor at the time of
occurence. We reject intervenor's contention that the
fact of hiring insulated him from all inquiry as to prior
events related to the Papers, but not to intervenor. "
(A 29)

(My comment: I agree with the First Circuit as to the status of aides).
(f) Third parties.

The Court said:

"We hold that no immunity was conferred upon Beacon press
simply because, if he did Gravel delivered the papers to it
for private publication. "

Protective Order
It seems to me that the Court's protective order (set forth above)

goes beyond its opinion and effectively gives Gravel just about everything
he asked for except with respect to Beacon Press.
The first paragraph of the protective order relates to Gravel's
conduct, and says that no witness may be questioned as to Gravel's

6.
conduct at the subcommittee meeting nor may any witness be questioned
"if the questions are directed to the motives or purposes behind the Senator's
conduct at that meeting, about any communication with him or his aides
regarding the activities of the Senator or his aides during the period of their
employment, in preparation for and related to said meeting. "
(My Comment:
protective order.

I do not disagree with the substance of this part of the
The difficulty relatesto the phrase "motives or purposes",

which are very difficult to define precisely.

My tentative view is that I

would accept this paragraph, unless more specific language can be suggested.
The effect would be that each question would really have to be judged according
to how it is framed. )
The second paragraph of the protective order is troublesome. It
states that Rodberg may not be questioned about his acts, observations,
speak or communications while being interviewed for, and after being
employed as, an aide to Gravel provided only that his actions,observations
and speech "were in the course of his employment".
(My Comment: This seems to give Rodberg an even broader privilege than
Senator Gravel would have.

The "course of his employment" is not limited

in any way to legislative activities or to the legislative process.

Unless

I misread the order, if Gravel had sent Rodberg off to burglarize the Riggs
Bank to raise money for Gravel's campaign for reelection, this woul d be

7.
protected as it would surely be within the course of his employment.

*****
My Tentative Position:
:tik Although I will await the Conference hoping that the discussion

will help clarify my views, I presently come down: (i) thinking that the
ID.rst Circuit opinion is a good analysis of the problem generally and
specifically, except where it goes off the deep end as to a common law legislative privilege - which extends both to Gravel and his aides; and (ii) although
the first paragraph of the protective order - nebulous as some of the language
may be - seems reasonable and consistent with the opinion, I find the second
paragraph at variance both with the opinion and with rationality.
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CHAMBERS OF

JSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

June 5, 1972

Re:

No. 71-1017 No. 71-1026 -

Gravel v. U.S.
U.S. v. Gravel

Dear Byron:
You have prepared a very careful opinion
for these cases, and I am glad to join.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice White

cc:

The Conference

(Q:ou.rt of tqt 'Jjtnitt~ ,i)tatts
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CHAMBERS Of'

fHE CHIEF .JUSTICE

June 5, 1972

Re: No. 71-1017) -Gravel v. U. S.
No. 71-1026)- U. S. v. Gravel

Dear Byron:
Please join me.
Regards,

Mr. Justice White
Copies to the Conference
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tHAMBERS OF

JLISTICE wiLLIAM H. REHNQUIST
I

June 8, 1972

I

\
\

Re:

No. 71-1017) - Gravel v. u. S.
No. 71-1026) - u. s. v. Gravel

Dear Byron:
Please join me.

Mr. Justice White
Copies to the Conference

6/12/72
MEMO TO JUSTICE POWELL
Re: No. 71-1017 & 71-1026, Gravel v. U.

s.

Justice White's opinion in this case is pretty much along
the lines )fA which we both, I think, agreed the Court should

take~t says that the Senator has a privilege to prevent
the Executive from inquiring into matters protected by the
Clause even if the inquiry is made through aids, as opposed
to the Senator himselB It also says that republication is
not protected,

a~it

______

rejects the vague common law privilege

which CA 1 hinted at in its opinion.

........
There is only
one aspect

of the case with which I would quibble, but I think it is
nevertheless important.

...

In part IV of the opinion, beginning

on page 20, Justice White states, "The grand jury, therefore,
if relevant to its investigation into the possible violations
of the criminal law and

iNX§l!XXN!lfX~

absent Fifth

AmllfN!S.]U!lfND!lfNXX

Amendment objections,may require from Rodberg answers to
questions relating to his or the Senator's arrangements, if

-

- ---

any, with respect to rJublication or with respect to third
__......__ ..... .._...,...._,..
party conduct under valid investigation by the grand jury, as

"

--

long as the questions do not implicate legislative action of

-

-

----

---

the Senator."

-

With that statement, I am in complete agreement,

but the next sentence reveals that Justice White's interpretation
of "legislative action" is more narrow than I think proper.
I also think it is more narrow than the way you were thinking
before Conference when we talked, although admittedly we both
found it. somewhat difficult to focus on the rather nebulous
concepts that

underl~

this case.

-2-

The sentence to which I object reads:
"Neither do we perceive any constitutional or other privilege
that sheilds Rodberg, any more than any other witness,
from grand jury questions relevant to tracing the source
of obviously highly classified documents that came into
the Senator's possession and are the basic subj~ m?tter
of 1-r:cw}ry in th~s caseJ•tu~ .~ o--a....,...,. ~~
_.,t...<)

~-f_'l"'tp. ~~-:·

This same

not~on

~s

reflected

. - ([

~n

the Court's

.

f~nal

.

.

~nstruct~ons

to CA 1 in which Justice White says:
CA 1's order forbids questioning any witness, including
Rodberg "(4) except as proves relevant to investigating
possible third party crime, concerning any act, in itself
not criminal, performed by the Senator, or by his aids
in the course of their employment, in preparation for
the subcommittee hearing."
From all this I gather that Justice White feels that the Speech
or Debate Clause xNxk:bhrx permits the Executive to inquire
into how and where a Senator or Representative gathered information
which he used in making a speech or otherwise engaging in a
legislative fuhction protected by the Clause.
1

In short, he

is saying that entering a document into the record of a committee

( !:.:'

"legislative action" and therefore protected, but acquiring

-----

that document is not protected.

With this I cannot agree.

It seems to me first that United States v. Johnson ,

383 U.S. 169 (1966) specifically condemned quite similar
inquiries.

In Johnson the government prosecuted a Congressman

for conspiracy to defraud.

As a part of this conspiracy

Johnson gave a speech on the House floor defending Savings

& Loan institutions.

The inquiry which the Court found to

be in violation of the Speech or Debate Clause focused on
this speech, the reasons why it was given, and on how it was
prepared and where the information came from.

The Court said

"The language of the Soeech or Deba~e Clause clearlv
proscr~Des at Least some of tne ev~aence taKen auring

-3-

trial. Extensive questioning went on concerning how much
of the speech was written by Johnson himself, how much
by his administrative · assistant, and how much by outs,iders
representing the~ company. The 'government attorn~
asked Johnson specifical l y about certain sentences in the
speech, the reasons for their inclusion and his personal
knowled ge of the factual material supporting those statements.
In closing argument the theory of the prosecution was very
clearly dependen't on the wording of the speech. I n addition
to questioning the manner of preparation and the precise
ingredients of the speech, the Government inquired into
the motives for g iving it."
Accompanying this paragraph in the text, on pages 173-76,
are lengthy footnoes quoting the questions and statements made
by the government which the Cpurt found to be prohibited by
the Clause.

It is clear from reading xbnrx those footnotes

that the Court objected to inquiry into where Johnson obtained
the information that went into the speech.

Yet Justice White's

'nion specifically permits the same kind of inquiry in this

It seems to me that such

XHXNXMXXXNRXXNNNXNXE~x

inquiries

should be prohibited by the Clause because the gathering of
information and materials for use in the leg islative process
is a leg islative

function~.

To a certain extent the entire

committee phase of the le g islative process, to which Justice
White says the privilege applies, is an information- gathering
phas;t·

Surely, for example, if Senator Gravel had received

the Pentagon Papers from his source as a part of the committee
hearing , the Executive could make no
about

xkKx~x~~XXXNX

his acquisitiono

inquiry of Sen Gravel
As a practical matter,

however, not all information that serves as the basis of a
speech (I assume that entering a document into the record is
the functional equivalent of having included the document in
a speech ) is gathered by the committee system. Clearly one

-4-

leg itimate
source of information essential to the/leg islative function
of keeping tabs on Executive
by dis gruntled employees.
~

actions is information leaked

If, however, the executive can

compell a Member or his aids to indicate where the information
came from, it will undoubtedly dry up this source of information
to some extent.

That mi ght have some good effects for the

information obtained in this way is no doubt often of dubious
character, as in , for instances, the Optepka episodeo

On

the other hand, Sen. Williams of Delaware used to make good
use of such information in challeng ing what he believed to be
wasteful

pro g~ams.

The point is that if the privlege does

not protect the gathering of information u sed on the leg islative
process, the ability of Members to obtain certain information
will be impaired.
This is not to say that any activity involved in the
information gathering phase should be protected.

If a Member

is caught breaking and entering in order to obtain information,
it should not matter what his purpose was in enga g ing in such

I

illegal conduct.

More to the point, if the person from whom

Gravel ultimately received the papers enga ged in illegal
activity, he shoul d be tried.

But the Executive should not

be able to use the Senator or his aids as a conduit to the
ultimate source of the papers by merely saying that there is
•
a possible third party crime. To a certain extent, this is

\

what I thought the Court was saying in Brewster, Tllegal conduct
is punishable even if committed by a Senator and even if
related to the le g islative process, but the Executive in

-5prosecuting such conduct may not inquire of activity that is
part of the due functioning of the leg islative process.

I

think that obtaining information to be used in the process
is part of its due functioning , and I do not think the Executive
should be permitted to inquire into how that information was
obtained.
I n sum, I think JohnsoQ as well as the theory of the
Speech or Debate Clause being spun in Brewster prohibits asking
a Senator or his aids about where or how they got information
later used in the le g islative process.

It is perfectly permissible

to punish anyone for ille gal conduct even if it should be
shown that the conduct was connected with the gatherimg of
information to be used in the process, but you may not say to
a Senator where and how did you get the information on which
you based that speech.
I

suggest that you see if Justice White mi ght be willing

to alter the two sentences in the last part of his opinion.
Fox

w~ ~a~.
6/15/72

~~

MEMO TO JUSTICE POWELL

-

Re: 71-1017 and 71-1026, Gravel v. U.

-

s.

When we talked, I did not focus on your two suggested
changes in Justice White's opinion.

I a g ree with you that

some sort of I ~robable cause'\ requirement along the lines you
suggest is needed.
....

'7

I wonder, however, if that alone is enou gh

to permit a Member of Congress or his aid to be called before
a grand jury and asked about sources for data used in leg islative
proceedings.

For one thing , probable cause is not all that

strong a standard.

Yet if a Member or his aid is called before

a grand jury, the impact on his political career would be
quite serious.

In the public mind, being summoned before a

grand jury is something that happens to the Mafia or Communists
or other disreputable types.

If the Executive Branch wishes

to punish a Senator for some act which it illexxRxe dislikes for
political reasons and if it can somehow link the Senator with
a criminal investigation, it could summon him or an aid before
the grand jury thereby doing considerable damage to the Senator's
political reputation.

I do not suggest that this is what

happened here, but it could well be that a Senator might receive
information from a confidential source on which he might base
a speech not knowing that there had been any impropriety in
the source's acquisition of the information.

Calling him before

a grand jury mi ght injure the Senator severely for an act
which was altogether innocent except that it annoyed the
Executive Branch.
I do not mean to imply that in no case should a Senator or
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his aids be called before a grand jury to be asked about
sources, but I think a greater showing than probable cause
that a crime has been committed should be made.

I do not

have a standard completely doped out, but I should think that
probable cause plus some showing that the testimony of the
Senator or his aid was necessary to the investigation.
that way you could insure that genuine criminal acts

In

wNi~N

of which a Senator was an essential witness could not go
uninvestigated but you would prevent the Executive from calling
a Senator or his aid when their testimony was not essential
and when the purpose of making them witnesses is to embarass
them politically.

It seems to me that such a result would

protect both the Executive's interest in searching out and
prosecuting crime and the legislator's interest in independence
which is reflected in the Speech or Deba.et clause.
Incidentally in your second rider, the one that beg ins
with (4 ) , I think there is a missing negative.

Shouldn't

the words in brackets read "no questions may be asked"?
Fox

June 18, 1972

Re: No. 71-1017 and No. 71-1026 Gravel
v. u.s.
Dear Byron:
There is one point in the opinioo. which possibly you may want
to take a second look at. It relates to the '1hird party" crime problem
and whether there is any real danger of a member of Congress (or
his aide) being harused as to his sources an the pretect that such a
crime had been committed.
I enclose a draft rider for your subparagraph 4, page 21,
which you might consider. It suggests that there must be probable
cause to believe a third party crime has been committed before a
member of the Congress or his aide may be interrogated.
It might also be desirable to require a showing that the
testimony is reasonably necessary to a proper investigation of the
crime.
I am fully in accord with your basic proposition that the privilege
should 1M prevent a bona fide investigation of a third party crime,

provided no legislative act is implicated.
If you can include a clarification along these lines, I think it
might be helpful. Your opinion, an a difficult and delicate subject,
is an excellent one and 1 am happy to join you - as I am doing in a

separate note to the Conference.
Sincerely,
Mr. Justice White
be: Phil

Rider, p. 21
( 4) except where there is probable cause to believe a third party
crime has been committed, [no questions may be asked] concerning
any act, in itself not criminal, performed by the Senator or by his
aides in the course of their employment in preparation for the subcommittee hearing.

June 18, 1972

Re: No. 71-1017 and No. 71-1026 - Gravel
Dear Byron:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice White
cc: The Conference

